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John McEvoy* Atlantic Canada: The
Constitutional
Offshore Regime
Does not the worst evil for a state arise from anything that tends
to rend it asunder and destroy its unity, while nothing does it
more good than whatever tends to bind it together and make it
one? There is not.
Plato, The Republic
Book V, Ch. X.
While it is a truism that people shape resources, it is equally true
that resources shape people. This is so not only in terms of the
individual but also of his society. Resources are the foundation of
economic development - upon them turn such diverse questions as
where a population will settle and the level of education required of
that population for the harvesting of the resource. The regions of
Canada are not diversified as much by strict cultural populations as
with the resources which have shaped the regional populations.
To date, the Atlantic provinces have seemingly been by-passed
from the mainstream of Canadian economic development. How-
ever, in the eastern provinces there presently exists the possibility of
a resource bonanza in the form of offshore oil and gas development.
The ramifications to the peoples of these provinces are immense.
Accordingly, it is crucial if they are to benefit fully in any economic
renewal that the regional governments, with necessarily regional
interests, have the greatest say in that offshore development.
The constitutional issue of offshore ownership has already been
litigated with respect to the Pacific Offshore' and now the question
of the Atlantic offshore, more particularly that of Newfoundland, is
before the Supreme Court of Canada on a Reference by the
Governor-General in Council,2 and has also been referred to the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal by the Lieutenant-Governor in
*Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick
1. Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792 and Re
Strait of Georgia (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 97 (C.A.) heard on appeal by the Supreme
Court of Canada 26-28 October 1982, judgment not yet delivered.
2. Heard in February 1983, judgment not yet delivered.
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Council. 3 It is therefore a propitious moment to pause and review
the offshore constitutional regime applicable to the eastern
provinces, especially Newfoundland.
I. R. v. Keyn
1. The Foundation
The starting point in any discussion of offshore mineral ownership
and jurisdiction in the Canadian context must relate to the
controversial 1876 decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved,
R. v. Keyn. 4 Ferdinand Keyn, a German national, was the
commander of the German steamer Franconia which, during the
course of its seventh voyage from Hamburg to St. Thomas in the
now Virgin Islands, ran into and sank the British steamer
Strathclyde at a point within two and one-half miles from the Dover
beach, resulting in the death of one Jessie Dorcas Young. Keyn was
indicted for manslaughter and in the course of his defence, counsel
questioned the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court to try the
accused. Though convicted at trial, this objection was upheld by a
bare majority of the 13 judges delivering opinions in the appeal to
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. 5
Before examing the judgments of the Court, it may be worthwhile
to note that varing interpretations have been placed on the majority
holding of a lack of jurisdiction. D. P. O'Connell has stated
categorically two divergent ratios. Writing in 1958, he stated:
The famous Franconia case, R. v. Keyn, decided that British
Crown land terminates with the low-water mark and that British
legislatures exercise over the territorial sea no more than limited
jurisdiction not amounting to actual 'possession' or 'occupation'
of the area so as to include it within the national boundary.
6
R. v. Keyn ... clearly decided.., that the territory of England
ends at the low-water mark and that the jurisdiction of the
3. Re Offshore Mineral Rights of Newfoundland, slip judgment, 17 February 1983
(C.A).
4. R. v. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63. The following analysis is rather detailed
because of the significance of the case and the absence of such analysis by other
commentators.
5. Cockburn C.J.; Kelly C.B.; Bramwell J.A.; Lush and Field JJ.; Sir R.
Phillimore and Pollock B. (Lord Coleridge C.J.; Brett and Amphlett JJ.A.; Grove,
Denman and Lindley JJ.; dissenting) (Archibald J. died prior to judgment).
6. D.P. O'Connell, Problems of Australian Coastal Jurisdiction (1958), 34
B.Y.I.L. 199,201.
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Admiral which begins at that point did not, historically, embrace
foreign nationals.
7
However, writing in 1971, O'Connell gave a much more limited
view of Keyn:
The case called for no more than a decision on the jurisdiction of
the courts, as historically determined, and this point was
intrinsically unconnected with the question of the extent of the
Crown's domain. 8
There is, therefore, ground for argument that the true ratio
decidendi in R. v. Keyn was that the common law jurisdiction
terminated at the low-water mark, and that nothing more fell to
be decided, although it is clear that a majority of the Court
thought they were deciding more. 9
What in fact was the ratio of the R. v. Keyn? As O'Connell has
pointed out, by his two views expressed thirteen years apart, there
can be a wide and a narrow construction.
As all the judges in Keyn recognized the common law courts of
Oyer and Terminer dealt with the administration of criminal law in
the body of a county, while the jurisdiction of the Admiral had been
declared by statute, 13 Rich. 2, c.5 (1389) to be such that "the
admirals and their deputies shall not meddle from henceforth of
anything done within the realm, but only of a thing done upon the
sea." Subsequently, by 15 Rich. 2, c.3 (1391), it was further
Declared, ordained and established, that of all manner of
contracts, pleas, and quarrels, and all other things rising within
the bodies of the counties, as well by land as by water, and also
of wreck of the sea, the admiral's Court shall have no manner of
cognizance, power, nor jurisdiction; but all such manner of
contracts, pleas and quarrels, and all other things rising within
the bodies of counties, as well by land as by water, as afore, and
also wreck of the sea, shall be tried, determined, discussed and
remedied by the laws of the land, and not before nor by the
admiral nor his lieutenant in anywise, nevertheless, of the death
of a man, and of a maihem done in great ships, being and
hovering in the main stream of great rivers, only beneath the
bridges of the same rivers nigh to the sea, and in none other
places of the same rivers, the admiral shall have cognizance.
7. Ibid., 209.
8. D.P. O'Connell, The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea (1971), 45
B.Y.I.L. 303, 331.
9. Ibid., 377.
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It is important to note that in order to sustain the conviction, it was
necessary to find jurisdiction in the Admiral. It was not sufficient to
merely find that the offence had been committed within British
territory; for in that event, the Central Criminal Court, being
territorially limited in its common law jurisdiction to the City of
London and adjoining parishes in the counties of Essex, Kent and
Surrey would still have been without jurisdiction. The key to
sustaining the conviction was that it be found to have been entered
pursuant to the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Central Criminal
Court. The incident giving rise to the indictment having occurred on
the high seas and therefore beyond the low-water mark being the
extent of the county, all judges recognized that the common law
courts lacked jurisdiction.10
What was the criminal jurisdiction of the Admiral? Historically,
except for piracy, it was limited to offences committed on British
ships; each vessel being an extension of British territory. 1' It was on
this basis that Denman J. supported the conviction, being of the
view that the offence of manslaughter was to be treated as having
been committed on the British steamer rammed by the Franconia.1
2
If the incident had occurred beyond the extent of the territorial sea,
it is clear that the conclusion of Denman J. (concurred in by Lord
Coleridge C. J. but with doubt' 3) would have been crucial.
However, it was the existence of the concept of the territorial sea in
international law and the juridical incidents thereby arising which
were of significance in deciding the question of jurisdiction. In
examining this concept, various members of the Court grappled
with the important relationship between international and municipal
law.
As noted by Cockburn C.J., the term "realm" was capable of
and had been used in two distinct meanings (a) "as in the statute of
Richard II, to mean the land of England, and the internal sea within
it ... (b) whatever the sovereignty of the Crown of England
extended, or was supposed to extend, over.' 1 4 Thus, one could
have rationally accepted that the Admiral was not to meddle within
the land territory or "realm" of England, being the domain of the
10. Accordingly, the word "realm" in 13 Rich. 2, c. 5 and "counties" in 15
Rich. 2, c. 3 were synonyms.
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common law courts, and still recognize that the "realm" or
sovereignty of England extended beyond that land territory into the
littoral sea. This latter extension could be of two kinds: (a) merely
jurisdictional or (b) proprietary in nature equivalent to that over the
land territory. Whether there was such an extension of British
territory or "realm" depended on the further concept of reception of
international law by municipal law.
2) The Minority Opinion
Delivering what may be properly considered the main judgment of
the minority, Brett J.A. considered that international law, being
promulgated by the consent of nations, 15 was automatically
received and enforced as part of the municipal law of England. 16
Notwithstanding that the views of various publicists exposed a
marked difference of opinion as to the characteristics of the
territorial sea in international law, Brett J.A. accepted a consensus
on the reality of the littoral state's relationship to its territorial sea
and that particulars as to the extent of that reality could be furnished
by accepting lowest common denominators. Thus the canon shot or
three mile rule provided the geographic limit of the territorial sea
notwithstanding varying expressions of learned publicists expound-
ing a greater extent. 17 However, as to the juridical nature of the
three mile zone, Brett J.A. rejected any theory of neutrality or
limited rights in the territorial sea, in favour of the view that:
the open sea within three miles of the coast is a part of the
territory of the adjacent nation, as much and as completely as if it
were land a part of the territory of such nation...
If so, that three miles are its territorial waters, subject to its rights
of property, dominion, and sovereignty. Those are all the rights,
and the same rights which a nation has, or can have, over its land
territory. 18
Having thus concluded that the doctrine of the territorial sea was
received in English municipal law and the nature of that doctrine,
the next step for Brett J.A. was to determine if English criminal law
was applicable in the zone or in the alternative, if there existed a
legal hiatus. This issue was easily resolved by observing that
15. Id., 131.
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"whether... written or unwritten, if such law be promulgated in
general terms, [it] must, of necessity, apply to the whole territory of
such state." 19 It is interesting to note that one of the authorities
cited in illustration of this proposition,20 as applicable specifically
to the territorial sea, concerned the Merchant Shipping Act,
legislation which by its very nature applied to the off-shore waters
of the state as a matter of particular legislative jurisdiction, rather
than as a general legislative enactment for the land territory of the
state.
These holdings by themselves were not sufficient to sustain the
conviction of Keyn for manslaughter. It remained to find that the
jurisdiction of the Admiral was such as to include a foreigner
travelling on a foreign ship within the territorial sea; a proposition
contrary to its generally recognized extent.
Although the statutes of Richard II restricted the Admiral from
meddling within the realm or territory of a county, in no way was
the Admiral expressly restricted beyond a county. Ipso facto,
concluded Brett J.A., the jurisdiction of the Admiral was a residual
jurisdiction encompassing the territory of the realm not within a
county. 2' Accordingly, the Admiral would have had jurisdiction to
try Keyn for an offence, contrary to the general criminal law of
England, if such offence occurred within three miles of low-water
mark; the successor Central Criminal Court, likewise.
In this reasoning concurred three other members of the Court:
Denman and Grove J.J. and Lord Coleridge C.J. Denman J. did so
specifically, while Grove J. followed a similar reasoning process in
a separate judgment. Concluding that international law, per a
review of publicists, recognized a territorial sea within the absolute
dominion of the littoral state, Grove J. also concluded, as had Brett
J.A., that no special legislation was strictly necessary to extend the
criminal law:
The criminality of and punishment for such offence is a part of
the common law of the realm, not originated by statutory
legislation. If the locality where the offence is committed is
within the realm, a statute is unnecessary, if not, it is ultra
vires .22
19. Id., 144.
20. Id., 138; General Iron Screw Colliery Co. v. Schurmanns (1860), 1 J. & H.
180, 70 E.R. 712 (Ch.).
21. Supra, note 4, 145-46.
22. Id., 115.
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Lord Coleridge C.J., in a brief concurring judgment, premised his
conclusion on the reasoning that "English Courts may give effect,
as part of English law" 23 without the necessity of an Act of
Parliament, 24 to principles of international law, extending the realm
into the territorial sea. Although expressly assenting "without
qualification" to the judgment of Brett J.A., Lord Coleridge C.J.
did not use expressions signifying state proprietary ownership in the
territorial sea. Rather, he was satisfied that it had been shown that
''some portion of the coast waters of a country is considered for
some purposes to belong to the country the coasts of which they
wash."
2 5
The judgment of Lindley J. does not deal specifically with the
question of property rights in the territorial sea, 26 but rather was
limited to the jurisdictional issue. Accepting that international law
recognized littoral state dominion over adjoining seas, Lindley J.
construed the general wording of two statutes, 28 Hen 8, c. 15 and
39 Geo. 3, c.37, both concerned with criminal jurisdiction, as
extending municipal criminal law to that area.
2 7
Amphlett J.A., in a brief and unremarkable judgment, contented
himself with the assertion that "The assumption by the legislature
and in judicial decisions that the three mile zone is English territory
... is in accordance with and fully warranted by international
law." 2 8 From the absence of appropriate discussion in his
judgment, it may be assumed that he concurred with Brett J.A. and
Lord Coleridge C.J. that an Act of Parliament was not necessary for
the reception of international law and, from his phrasing, that he
would have viewed the territorial sea as being included within the
proprietary rights of the littoral state.
3) The Majority Opinion
Cockburn C.J., in a lengthy judgment concurred in by Pollock B.
and Field J., delivered the main reasoning of the majority. The
starting point in his reasoning involved an examination of the
division of curial authority between the common law courts, as
23. Id., 154.
24. Id., 152.




Atlantic Canada: The Constitutional Offshore Regime 291
restricted to the body of a county, and the jurisdiction of the
Admiral on the high seas. To maintain the conviction of Keyn, the
jurisdiction of the Admiral must have been such as to have included
both the nature and locality of the offence. Cockburn C.J. reviewed
the historical division of jurisdiction between the Admiral and the
common law courts, stating:
From the earliest period of our legal history, the cognizance of
offences committed on the high seas had been left to the
jurisdiction of the admiral. And the reason is obvious. By the old
common law of England, every offence was triable in the county
only in which it had been committed, as from that county alone
the "pais", as it was termed - in other words, the jurors by
whom the fact was to be ascertained - could come. But only so
much of the land of the outer coast as was uncovered by the sea
was held to be within the body of the adjoining county. If an
offence was committed in a bay, gulf or estuary, inter fauces
terrae, the common law could deal with it, because the parts of
the sea so circumstanced were held to be within the body of the
adjacent county or counties; but, along the coast, on the external
sea, the jurisdiction of the common law extended no further than
to low-water mark. But, as from the time when ships began to
navigate the sea, offences would be committed on it which
required to be repressed and punished, while the common law
jurisdiction and procedure was inapplicable to such offences, as
not having been committed within the boundary of any county,
the authority of the Crown in the administration of justice in
respect of such crimes was left to the admiral, as exercising the
authority of the sovereign upon the seas. 29
The exact delineation of jurisdiction between the courts had been
declared by the statutes 13 Rich. 2, c.5 and 15 Rich. 2, c.3 (as
discussed supra) and observed Cockburn C.J.,
Upon this footing the criminal law has remained ever since.
Whatever of the sea lies within the body of a county is within the
jurisdiction of the common law. Whatever does not, belonged
formerly to that of the Admiralty and now belongs to the courts to
which the jurisdiction of the admiral has been transferred by
statute. ..30
What, in terms of the nationality or flag of the vessel, was the
specific jurisdiction of the Admiral? It was limited "except in the
case of piracy, which, as the pirate was considered the communis
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respect of English ships. Consequently, unless the further Crown
arguments were upheld, the conclusion was inescapable that the
Central Criminal Court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
trying and convicting Keyn, the commander of a German vessel. It
was necessary, therefore, that Cockburn C.J. examine the issue of
the nature and applicability of the doctrine of the territoral sea.
Commencing this stage of his analysis, Cockburn C.J. made it
very clear that in his view the assertion of the doctrine of the
territorial sea did not invoke any vestige of the ancient theory of the
"narrow seas", described by Sir Leoline Jenkins in the reign of
Charles II, as "this authority and jurisdiction of the King to
preserve the public peace and to maintain the freedom and security
of navagation all the world over. . . . 32 This rejection of any
relationship between the concepts of the territorial sea and the
narrow seas was critical since the latter doctrine, as expressed by
such eminent authorities as Coke and Hale, included within its
scope the assertion that the "bed of the sea is part of the realm of
England, part of the territorial possession of the Crown".
33
However, tied to a doctrine dismissed by Cockburn C.J. as "at all
times unfounded [and] long since abandoned''3 4 , the historical
claim to the seabed was also rejected. 35 Shorn of any historical
pretensions, the doctrine of the territorial sea had to be justified, if
at all, as a received proposition of international law.
From an extensive survey of the writings of publicists, in relation
to the concept, Cockburn C.J. concluded that notwithstanding that
there was no doubt of the general acceptance in principle that the
territorial sea should be treated as belonging to the littoral state,
It [was] equally clear that, in the practical application of the rule,
in respect of the particular of distance, as also in the still more
essential particular of the character and degree of sovereignty and
dominion to be exercised, great difference of opinion and
uncertainty have prevailed and still continue to exist. 36
In contradistinction to the argument of Brett J.A., Cockburn C.J.
was unwilling to recognize a doctrine of the territorial sea based on
the lowest common denominators among publicists. In his view,
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the zone as to three miles or the range of canon shot, absolute or
limited sovereignty, jurisdiction and property rights tended to
negate the very existence of the doctrine. Absent unanimity of
particulars, he was unwilling to accede to more than the view that at
most, by the
concurrence of other nations, such a state may deal with these
waters as subject to its legislation. But it wholly fails to show
that, in the absence of such legislation the ordinary law of the
local state will extend over the waters in question. .. 37
It is obviously one thing to say that the legislature of a nation
may, from the common assent of other nations, have acquired the
full right to legislate over a part of that which was before high
sea, and as such common to all the world; another and a very
different thing to say that the law of the local state becomes
thereby at once, without anything more, applicable to foreigners
within such part, or that, independently of legislation, the Courts
of the local state can proprio vigore so apply it. The one position
does not follow from the other; and it is essential to keep the two
things; the power of Parliament to legislate, and the authority of
our Courts, without such legislation, to apply the criminal law
where it could not have been applied before, altogether
distinct .... 38
Had Parliment exercised this jurisdiction?
Cockburn C.J. concluded, from an analysis of existing
legislation, that it had not, stating "there has been no assertion of
legislative authorization in the general application of the penal law
to foreigners within the three mile zone. The legislature has omitted
to adopt the alleged sovereignty over the littoral sea, to the extent of
making our penal law applicable. ... 39 Aside from general
legislation relating to the British mercantile trade and restricted to
British ships, the legislation proffered by the Crown, as supporting
an exercise of specific jurisdiction over the territorial sea, was found
to have been merely an exercise of every nation's "right to secure
itself from injury", per Marshall C.J. in Church v. Hubbard, 40 in
the sense of legislation "confined to the maintenance of neutral
rights and obligations, the prevention of breaches of the revenue and
37. Id., 193; see also, 203.
38. Id., 207.
39. Id., 219.
40. 2 Cranch (U.S.) 234.
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fishery laws, and under particular circumstances, to cases of
collision.'"41
It was for Parliament to legislatively recognize the doctrine of the
territorial sea, and not for the courts in what Cockbum C.J., in an
obvious reference to the minority of the Court, considered an
unconstitutional violation of fundamental principles to so strain and
misapply judicial authority to overcome the jurisdictional lacuna. 4
2
Accordingly, the Cornwall Mining case, 43 relied upon by both
Amphlett J.A. and Lord Coleridge C.J. for the proposition that
Parliament had in consequence of the arbitration declared Crown
ownership in the littoral zone, was restricted to its factual context by
Cockburn C.J.: "There was a bill for the settlement of the question
as to the right to particular mines and minerals between the Crown
and the Duchy, a measure in which both the royal personages
particularly concerned and their respective advisors concurred, and
in which no other person whatever was interested." 44 It had been a
private dispute resolved on the basis that the mines below low-water
mark were not within the Duchy of Cornwall, so as to vest in the
Prince of Wales as Duke.
Cockburn C.J. further dissented from the view of Denman J. that
the offence had been committed aboard a British ship.
In the result, the conviction of Keyn entered by the Central
Criminal Court, in the purported exercise of a jurisdiction not
historically competent to the Admiral, was, per Cockburn C.J., a
nullity.
Lush J. did not deliver the separate judgment he had prepared
owing to full agreement with Cockburn C.J. He did state as a
conclusion, however, that
although, as between nation and nation, these waters are British
territory, as being under the exclusive dominion of Great Britain,
in judicial language they are out of the realm [the limit of the
common law], and any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a
foreign ship in these waters must in my judgment be authorized
by an Act of Parliament.
45
41. Supra, note 4, 214. Of particular significance is the reference to "so-called
'hovering Acts' and Acts relating to the Customs" (Ibid., 215) as examples of such
jurisdiction.
42. Id., 231.
43. Cornwall Submarine Mines Act, 1858, 21-22 Vict., c. 109 (U.K.).
44. Supra, note 1,201.
45. Id., 239.
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Sir R. Phillimore, concurred in by Kelly C.B., noted, in
commencing his judgment, "a total absence of precedents since the
reign of Edward III, if indeed any existed then, to support the
doctrine that the realm of England extend[ed] beyond the limits of
counties." '46 Absent jurisdiction by common law or legislation to
try Keyn, Phillimore J. asked rhetorically: by what law did such
jurisdiction arise? 47 The Crown had argued international law.
Analysis of the opinions of publicists led Phillimore J. to the
conclusion that each state had been recognized as possessing
dominium over "a maritime extension of frontier to the distance of
three miles from low-water mark . . . [for the attainment of] the
defence and security of the adjacent state.' '48 However, such
"dominium" would not allow the state the "same rights of
jurisdiction and property which appertain to it in respect to its land
and its ports." 49 It is to be noted that while Phillimore J. employed
the word "dominium" at this point, in his judgment he had earlier
phrased the following question and answer:
Is a state entitled to any extension of dominium beyond
low-water mark?...
The answer may be given without doubt or hesitation, namely,
that a state is entitled to a certain extension of territory, in a
certain sense of that word, beyond low-water mark. 5
0
Phillimore J., it is submitted, directed his analysis to jurisdictional
and not proprietary interests, notwithstanding the use of the word
"dominium" which normally ascribes the latter.
Accepting that common law jurisdiction ended at low-water
mark, the legal regime imposed over the territorial sea must
therefore have been statutory in nature. Phillimore J. echoed
somewhat the views of Brett J.A. in observing, though to a contrary
result, that if that zone was within the territory of England there
would have been no need of specific legislation dealing with
offshore naval relations, since those involved would already have
been subject to the existing law of the land. 51 Rather, it was the very
existence of such offshore legislation that confirmed the necessity of
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to the offshore zone. Phillimore J. also rejected the minority view
that the offence had been committed aboard a British ship so as to
ground admiralty jurisdiction on that basis.
Bramwell S.A. contented himself with a brief statement to the
effect that the jurisdiction of the Admiral extended only to British
ships on the high seas and therefore did not cover the offence in
question arising on a foreign vessel on the high seas.52
4) A Summary
By a bare majority, 7-6, the Court for Crown Cases Reserved
determined that in the year 1876 the Jurisdiction of the Admiral did
not extend to offences committed aboard foreign ships on the high
seas even where the locality was within the three mile offshore zone
from low-water mark. Four members of the Court, Grove and
Denman J.J., Amphlett and Brett J.J., explicitly recognized this
zone as being within the territory or realm of the state for all
purposes of sovereignty and proprietorship. That alone would not
have settled the jurisdictional issue since the Central Criminal Court
was territorially restricted to the City of London and adjacent
parishes in the counties of Essex, Kent and Surrey in the exercise of
its common law criminal jurisdiction 53 - which territory did not
include the region of Dover nor its adjacent offshore zone. It was
therefore necessary, in order to sustain the conviction, to hold
additionally that the historical jurisdiction of the Admiral was a
residual one, from which had been excepted by statute offences
occasioned above low-water mark, thereby leaving within that
residual jurisdiction, offshore territory within the realm.
Eight members of the Court, Lord Coleridge C.J., Cockburn
C.J., Kelly C.B., Sir R. Phillimore and Pollock B., and Lindley,
Field and Lush J.J., recognized that a littoral state, by the consent of
nations, i.e. international law, had or might have had the capacity to
exercise at least some rights in relation to the territorial sea. Lord
Coleridge C.J. and Lindley J. held that as a universally recognized
proposition of international law, such was automatically received as
part of the municipal law enforceable by English courts. The other
six members of the Court either rejected the contention that there
existed a universal doctrine on the territorial sea, owing to the
differences of opinion among publicists, and/or that such a
52. Id., 149-50.
53. 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 36, s. 2 (U.K.) (1834).
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proposition if universally recognized, was not received law without
the legislative sanction of Parliament, which was not found to have
been expressed.
It is on the distinction between a dualist and monistic doctrine
regarding the relationship between international and municipal law,
that Lauterpacht, the editor of Oppenheim's International Law (7th
ed.) 54 refers to the Keyn decision. He cites "the dicta of some
judges in The Franconia case in 1876" 55 as reversing his general
principle that "all such rules of customary International Law as are
either universally recognized or have at any rate received the assent
of this country are per se part of the law of the land.' '56 But, was it
not crucial to the majority in Keyn that no such universal rule
realting to the territorial sea existed, so as to be received law, or that
if it did exist, it merely allowed the coastal state to extend its
legislative control for certain purposes and the issue was precisely
whether or not the state had done so? In other words, a capacity
might have been recognized but the exercise of rights pursuant to
that capacity was another matter.
Following judgment in Keyn, The United Kingdom Parliament in
1878 statutorily reversed the result of the majority opinion by, in
effect adopting that opinion57 and expressly extended the
jurisdiction of the Admiral to "an offence committed by a person,
whether he is or is not a subject of Her Majesty, on the open sea
within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions .... "58
"Territorial Waters" was defined as59
such part of the sea adjacent ot the coast of the United Kingdom,
or the coast of some other part of Her Majesty's dominions, as is
deemed by international law to be within the territorial
sovereignty of Her Majesty; and for the purpose of any offence
declared by this Act to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiral,
any part of the open sea within one marine league of the coast
54. Vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948), 37-38.
55. Id., 38.
56. Id., 37.
57. contra: R. v. Dudley & Stephens (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273, 281 "the opinion of
the minority in the Franconia Case has been since not only enacted but declared by
Parliament to have been always the law.. .", per Lord Coleridge C.J. (Grove and
Denman JJ., Pollock and Huddleston RB.) Contrast with: Harris v. Franconia
(1877), 2 C.P.D. 173, 46 L.J.Q.B. 363; Blackpool Pier Co. v. Flyde Union
(1877), 36 L.T. 251, 46 L.J.M.C. 189.
58. Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, 41 & 42 Victs., c. 73, s. 2 (U.K.).
59. Id.,s. 7.
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measured from low-water mark shall be deemed to be open sea
within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions.
It is perhaps significant that the draftsman of the preamble to this
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, though declaring the
"rightful" ab initio jurisdiction of Her Majesty over the adjacent
open seas, adopted the phrasing of Phillimore J.,60 one of the
majority in Keyn, by expressly qualifying the nature of such
jurisdiction "as is necessary for the defence and security of such
dominions". 61 The nature of this jurisdiction as recognized by
international law, per Phillimore J., was not equivalent to that over
land territory. Finally, it should be noted, (a) that this Act applied
not only to the United Kingdom proper, but to all the then Empire
and (b) that there was no assertion of a proprietary interest in the
coastal zone.
II. B.C. Offshore Reference
Jumping in time ninety-one years, one comes to the most crucial
decision relating to offshore jurisdiction in the Canadian context,
the 1967 joint opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference
Re: Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia. 6 ' Two years prior
to judgment, the Governor-General in Council had referred to the
Court two questions:
1. In respect of the lands, including the mineral and other natural
resources, of the sea bed and subsoil seaward from the ordinary
low-water mark on the coast of the mainland and the several
islands of British Columbia, outside the harbours, bays, estuaries
and other similar inland waters, to the outer limit of the territorial
sea of Canada, as defined in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones
Act, Statues of Canada 1964, Chapter 22, as between Canada and
British Columbia,
(a) Are the said lands the property of Canada or British
Columbia?
(b) Has Canada or British Columbia the right to explore and
exploit the said lands?
(c) Has Canada or British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in
relation to the said lands?
2. In respect of the mineral and other natural resources of the sea
bed and subsoil beyond that part of the territorial sea of Canada
60. Supra, note 4, 81.
61. Supra, note 58, preamble.
62. [1967] S.C.R. 792.
63. Id., 796.
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referred to in Question 1, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the mineral and other natural resources of the said
areas, as between Canada and British Columbia,
(a) Has Canada or British Columbia the right to explore and
exploit the said mineral and other natural resources?
(b) Has Canada or British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in
relation to the said mineral and other natural resources?
63
It is to be noted that though question l(a) is framed in terms of
"property" in the territorial sea, the second question merely refers
to the exercise of state rights under the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf. 64 On first impression, it might appear that the
Court in response to question l(a) dealt with 'property' in the
common law proprietary sense, since it merely concluded on this
point: "The sovereign state which has the property in the bed of the
territorial sea adjacent to British Columbia is Canada." '6 5 Indeed
this is the view of some commentators. 66 However, the Court
observed that Canada, one of the parties-litigant, did not ascribe to
the word "property" such a meaning, but rather argued that the
word "means rights recognized by international law as described in
the Geneva Convention of 1958".67 It is submitted that this more
restricted meaning is the sense utilized by the Court in declaring the
property of the territorial sea to be in Canada.
By its Terms of Union with Canada in 1871, the Constitution Act,
1867,68 was made applicable to British Columbia as if it "had been
one of the Provinces originally united by the said Act", subject of
course to the express provisions of the Terms. 69 Therefore, by
virtue of s.109 of that Act, British Columbia enjoyed confirmed
ownership to "All lands, mines, minerals and royalties belonging"
to the province as of the date of Union. 70 It being further undisputed
that the limits or territorial extent of the province had not been
altered following Union, 71 the clear issue before the Court was
64. Reproduced, Ibid., 819.
65. Id., 816.
66. e.g. R.J. Harrison, Jurisdiction Over the Canadian Offshore: A Sea of
Confusion (1979) 17 OsgoodeHall. L.3. 469, 490-81.
67. Id., 800.
68. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
69. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, no. 10, paragraph 10.
70. Subject to the express transfers by s. 108 of the Act of public works and
property.
71. Pursuant to the Constitution Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 28, s. 3.
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whether or not the offshore zones were within the boundary or
territory of British Columbia in 1871.
The Court divided its consideration of the offshore zones into
separate treatment of the territorial sea and the continental shelf.
The major stumbling block to a finding that the territorial sea was
within the limits of British Columbia in 1871 was the existent
definition of the provincial boundaries as framed by the Imperial
constitutive legislation. Each of these statutes72 defined the western
boundary of the then colony as "the Pacific Ocean". Strictly
interpreting this boundary limit, the Court could have rested its
opinion on the finding that, disregarding waters inter fauces terrae,
the low-water mark of the Pacific Ocean along the British Columbia
coast being the western extent of the province, thereby excluded the
territorial sea from its "property" and "jurisdiction". 73 However,
the Court did not so expressly conclude, preferring instead to
ground its decision on the juridical concept of the territorial sea as
expressed in the majority reasoning of the Court for Crown Cases
Reserved in R. v. Keyn. 74 Of that case, the Court stated:
The English Criminal Courts would have had jurisdiction if the
act had occurred within the body of a county of England. The
question whether the territorial sea was within the body of a
county was, therefore, directly in issue. If it had been within the
body of the county, the Court of Oyer and Terminer would have
had jurisdiction. The majority decision of the court was that the
territory of England ends at low-water mark. There was,
therefore, no jurisdiction in the Court of Oyer and Terminer. The
court also held that the case did not fall within the historical
jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral. That court would have had
jurisdiction if the accused had been a British national. The
jurisdiction of the Admiral, which begins at low-water mark, did
not extend to foreign nationals on foreign ships.
75
As discussed above, even if the offence had been held to have
occurred within the body of a county, by the finding that the
territorial sea was within said body, the Central Criminal Court
would not have had jurisdiction to try Keyn. The Supreme Court's
72. Government of British Columbia Act, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 99, s. I (U.K.) (1858);
British Columbia Boundaries Act, 26 & 27 Vict., c. 83 , s. 3 (U.K.) (1863); Union
of British Columbia and Vancouver Island Act, 29 & 30 Vict., c. 67, ss. 7, 8
(U.K.) (1866); R.S.B.C. 1979, Appendix B.
73. The Legislature of a province being limited by the Constitution Act, 1867,
supra, note 68, section 92, to the exercise of its jurisdiction "in [the] province".
74. Supra, note 4.
75. Supra, note 62, 804.
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statement as to the directness of the issue concerning the territorial
sea is therefore suspect.
Of the eleven separate reasons for judgment delivered in Keyn,
the Court referred to and reproduced only that of Lush J. which was
to the effect that only by an Act of Parliament could the realm or
territory of the state be extended into the sea beyond its municipal
limits, notwithstanding that a zone had been "appropriated [by
international law] to the adjacent State to deal with . . . as the State
may deem expedient for its own interests". 76 The subsequent
enactment of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, did not,
in the Court's opinion, "purport to deal with the juridical character
of British territorial waters and the sea-bed beneath them" 77 but
rather "did no more than deal with what was regarded as a gap in
the Admiral's jurisdiction." '7 The Court then concluded that this
Imperial legislation, which was expressly operative in all British
colonies (so as to include British Columbia) was conclusive
evidence that the solum of the territorial sea was not within the
limits of the province. The Court pondered the question of what law
would have been applicable in 1879 to an offence "committed
within one marine league of the coast of British Columbia." ' 79 By
reasoning that the applicable criminal law would have been that of
England and not Canada, the Court categorically stated that the
legislation was "inconsistent with any theory that in 1878 the
Province of British Columbia possessed as part of its territory the
solum of the territorial sea." 80 That this statement is not necessarily
the proper conclusion to be drawn is rather self-evident when one
takes into consideration the effect of the ColonialLaws Validity Act,
186581 which would have imposed the jurisdictional result, due to
the repugnancy between the colonial criminal law and the "Act of
Parliament extending to the colony." 
82
By way of further confirmation, the Court then compared two






81. 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.).
82. Id., s. 2. See also, New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (1975), 135
C.L.R. 337, 436-37 (per Stephen J.); Harrison, supra, note 66,487.
83. The Customs Act, 1867, 31 Vict., c. 6, s. 83 and An Act Respecting Fishing by
Foreign Vessels, 31 Vict., c. 61, s. I (1868) (Can.) discussed Supra, note 62, 806.
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zones as "British waters", with a 1928 amendment to the Customs
Act 8 4 which altered the phrasing to read, "territorial waters of
Canada" and defined that zones as:
The waters forming part of the territory of the Dominion of
Canada and the waters adjacent to the Dominion within three
marine miles there-of, in the case of any vessel, and within
twelve miles thereof, in the case of any vessel registered in
Canada.8 5
The Court did not comment upon the obvious distinction drawn in
this definition between water within the territory of Canada and the
offshore zone. One would have thought that if Canada had
considered the three marine mile zone within its territory, the
legislation would have so reflected the juridical fact. Perhaps the
Court considered that such a point, in confirmation of R. v. Keyn,
had already been made by earlier references to two opinions of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Attorney-General for
British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada8" and Attorney-
Generalfor Canada v. Attorney-General for Quebec.8 7
In the former case, Viscount Haldane had stated:
In the argument before their Lordships much was said as to an
alleged proprietary title in the Province to the shore around its
coast within a marine league ... Their Lordships feel
themselves relieved from expressing any opinion on the question
whether the Crown has a right of property in the bed of the sea
below low-water mark to what is known as the three-mile limit,
. . . They desire, however, to point out that the three-mile limit is
something very different from the narrow seas limit discussed by
the older authorities such as Selden and Hale, a principle which
may safely be said to be now obsolete. The doctrine of the zone
comprised in the former limit owes its origin to comparatively
modem authorities on public international law. Its meaning is
still in controversy. . . . Until the Powers have adequately
discussed and agreed on the meaning of the doctrine at a
conference, it is not desirable that any municipal tribunal should
pronounce on it. ... 88
In the latter, Viscount Haldane seemingly reaffirmed the uncertain
state of the territorial sea doctrine, in the following passage, also
quoted by the Supreme Court:
84. S.C. 1928, c. 16.
85. Id., s. 207.
86. [1914] A.C. 153 (P.C.).
87. [1921] 1 A.C. 413 (P.C.).
88. Supra, note 86, 174.
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The Chief Justice, following their Lorships' view, expressed in
the British Columbia case, declined to answer so much of any of
the questions raised as related to the three-mile limit. As to this
their Lordships agree with him. It is highly inexpedient, in a
controversy of a purely municipal character such as the present,
to express an opinion on what is really a question of public
international law. If their Lordships thought it proper to entertain
such a question they would have directed the Home Government
to be notified, inasmuch as the point is one which affects the
Empire as a whole.8 9
The rejection of the doctrine of the territorial sea by Keyn in 1876
and the statements of the Judicial Committee alluding to its
uncertain and controversial status in 1914 and 1921 were sufficient
for the Court to conclude, that in 1871, the limits of British
Columbia did not extend into the territorial sea. The Court
specifically affirmed the proposition that such an extension could
have been occasioned during the colonial period, but had not, in
fact, occurred.
The Court illustrated this latter proposition by reference to The
Direct United States Cable Company v. The Anglo-American
Telegraph Company90 and R. v. Burt.91 In the former case, the
Privy Council upheld a Newfoundland Supreme Court injunction
prohibiting the appellant from using its cable within Conception
Bay, on the basis that by unquestioned Imperial legislation 92
exclusive dominion had been asserted over the Bay, and that
subsequently 93 "the Imperial Legislature conferred upon the
Legislature of Newfoundland the right to legislate with regard to
Conception Bay as part of the territory of Newfoundland. This is the
ratio of the case. . . . ,,94 In R. v. Burt, the seizure of a smuggling
vessel in the Bay of Fundy, one and three-quarters miles from the
coast, was held to have taken place within New Brunswick on the
basis of the territorial definition contained in the Royal Instructions,
issued pursuant to the Order in Council establishing the Province,
which described the southern boundary as a "line in the centre of
the Bay of Fundy from the River Saint Croix aforesaid to the mouth
of the Musquat (Missiquash) River." 95 In both decisions, the body
89. Supra, note87, 431.
90. (1877), 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C.).
91. (1932), 5M.P.R. 112(N.B.S.C.A.D.).
92. 59 Geo. 3, c. 38 (U.K.).
93. 35-36 Vict., c. 45 (U.K.).
94. Supra, note 62, 809.
95. R.S.N.B. 1973, App. III.
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of water in question had been claimed as historic inland waters
which, if accepted, would have included the subject bays within the
respective provinces without Imperial legislation.
The territorial sea not having been found to be within the limits of
British Columbia, it remained for the Court to positively establish
the legitimacy of Canada's claim to "property" and jurisdictional
rights.
Rights at international law in adjacent territorial seas accrue to the
sovereign state as the recognized actor in that field of law. Thus, it
was to the United Kingdom that any rights attached in relation to its
coastal colonies the world over. Having acquired the status of a
sovereign state "in the period between its separate signature of the
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the Statute of Westminister,
1931",96 it was therefore to Canada that such rights attached in
succession to the United Kingdom. "Property rights" in the
territorial sea, defined as the rights recognized by international law
and described in the Geneva Convention of 195897 were therefore
held by the Court to be vested in Canada.
Legislative jurisdiction was held also to be vested in Canada
under the general "Peace, Order and Good Government" power, in
the absence of any specific enumerated head of such subject matter
in the distribution of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867. Such
jurisdiction was of a permanent character since the explicit subject
matter is "of concern to Canada as a whole and [goes] beyond local
or provincial interests.' '98
There then followed the three sentences described by one
commentator as "so shocking in their impact, so far-reaching in
their consequences and so totally out of keeping with the tone of the
opinion to that point that one can only assume that the Court was not
cognizant of what it was saying" 99 :
Moreover, the rights in the territorial sea arise by international
law and depend upon recognition by other sovereign states.
Legislative jurisdiction in relation to the lands in question
belongs to Canada which is a sovereign state recognized by
96. Supra, note 62, 810.
97. Id., 800.
98. Id., 817. per national concern test of Attorney General for Ontario v. Canada
Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 (P.C.); N. Caplan, "Legal Issues of the
Offshore Mineral Rights Dispute in Canada" (1968), 14 McGill L.J. 475, 491.
99. I.L. Head, The Canadian Offshore Mineral Reference (1968), 18 U. of T.L.J.
131,147.
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international law and thus able to enter into arrangements with
other states respecting the rights in the territorial sea.
Canada is a signatory to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone and may become a party to other international
treaties and conventions affecting rights in the territorial sea. 100
In context, within the answer to the questions concerning the
territorial sea, these sentences might be dismissed as obiter, as a
mere expression by the Court of apparent satisfaction with the
consistency of the result arrived at with the realities of international
relations. These words cannot be so dismissed in relation to the
Court's answer to the question concerning the continental shelf.
If the territorial sea was not within the limits of British Columbia
in 1871, a fortiori the continental shelf, was the terse conclusion of
the Court in relation to that matter. Logically, one would not want
to have found the continental shelf to have been within the limits of
British Columbia in 1871 while at the same time concluding that the
territorial sea was not. Moreover, the Court gave as a second
explicit reason "why British Columbia lacks the right to explore
and exploit and lacks legislative jurisdiction:...
(2) Canada is the sovereign state which will be recognized by
international law as having the rights stated in the Convention of
1958, and it is Canada, not the Province of British Columbia, that
will have to answer the claims of other members of the
international community for breach of the obligations and
responsibilities imposed by the Convention." 101
If this second rationale is given independent vitality, it could be
construed as a repudiation of the Labour Conventions102 doctrine on
treaty implementation jurisdiction in the Canadian federal context.
By that doctrine, treaty making authority, as an executive act, is
vested in the federal government while the implementation of such
international agreements falls within the normal distribution of
legislative subject matters provided by the Constitution Act, 1867. It
would indeed be "shocking" for the Court to have intended the
reversal of such an accepted constitutional principle without greater
analysis. It would result in the federal level of the Canadian state
being able "merely by making promises to foreign countries [to]
clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the
100. Supra, note 62, 817.
101. Id., 821.
102. Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1937] A.C.
326 (P.C.).
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constitution which gave it birth . . . . ,03 If accepted, the
conclusion would have been inescapable that even if the Court had
determined that the territorial sea and continental shelf had been
within the territorial limits of the province, legislative jurisdiction
would have been held to rest with Parliament. 
10 4
I. L. Head' 0 5 has attributed to the Court an apparent confusion of
meaning, or at least an inconsistency, in the use of the word
"Canada", as at one time describing the federal juristic unit, and at
another, the internationally recognized sovereign state. It is to an
apparent lack of appreciation of the distinction between the two
meanings that Head attributes the Court's error. That Canada, the
national state, is recognized in international law as having rights in
relation to the territorial sea and continental shelf, it is argued, does
not necessarily mean that Canada, the federal juristic unit, is the
appropriate level of jurisdiction within the confines of domestic
constitutional law. That is a separate question for the determination
of such domestic law. 1
0 6
It is submitted, however, that to ascribe to the Court such an error
is to disregard the context of the statements. The particular zones in
issue had each been determined as being beyond the limits of the
province and therefore beyond its legitimate legislative jurisdiction.
The statements should not be given independent vitality, but rather
read in concert with their context, so as merely to reinforce the
existent conclusion of federal rights and jurisdiction.
The result arrived at by the Supreme Court of Canada is
consistent with that achieved in two other federal states enjoying a
common law heritage - the United States and Australia.
III. The United States: Tidelands Cases and Maine
Prior to 1937, the federal United States did not actively assert
claims to the territorial sea independent of those of individual
coastal states. 10 7 The offshore legal regime "Up to that time was
that the littoral states, with some exceptions, claimed ownership of
the bed of the sea out to three miles; and they exercised jurisdiction
103. Id., 352 per Lord Atkin.
104. H.A. Hubbard, "Constitutional Law" International Law: Ownership of and
Jurisdiction over Offshore Mineral Rights" (1968), 2 Ott. L.R. 212, 215.
105. Supra, note 99, 155.
106. Id., 134; Hubbard, supra, note 104, 214; Caplan, supra, note 98,492.
107. R.E. Hardwicke, et al, The Constitution and the Continental Shelf(1948), 26
Texas L.R. 398, 400.
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and control over such submerged areas in various ways."'
0 8
However, in that year the figurative gauntlet was thrown down by a
bill introduced in the Senate "declaring . . . 'all submerged lands
lying under the high seas off the coast of the continental United
States between the low-water marks and the three-mile limit' part of
the public domain"' 10 9 of the federal United States. This and
subsequent similar efforts failed to receive Congressional sanction
"due to the overwhelming opposition of the state governments and
the private oil interests." 1 0
In limbo during the prosecution of the war effort, the dispute was
revitalized in 1945 with the issuance of the Trueman Proclamation
of 28 September, whereby the President declared that "the
Government of the United States regards the natural resources of
the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas
but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to
the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.""' This
Proclamation was for external consumption only since, concur-
rently, an Executive Order was issued expressly declaring that:
"Neither this order nor the aforesaid Proclamation shall be
deemed to affect the determination by legislation or judicial
decree of any issues between the United States and the several
states relating to the ownership and control of the subsoil and sea
bed of the continental shelf within or outside the three-mile
limit." "2
It is to be noted that notwithstanding the generally accepted
understanding of the term "continental shelf" as excluding within
its ambit the territorial sea, and that though with such meaning the
Proclamation would not have forced the issue of the territorial seas
with the coastal states, the Executive order referred to the shelf




110. J.K. Delay, Jr., Comment: Constitutional Law - Relation of Federal and
State Governments - Title of United States to Tidelands (1951), 50 Mich. L.R.
114; L.R. Kuhn, Comment: Constitutional Law - Proprietary Rights of State and
Federal Governments in Land Under the Sea within the Three-Mile Limit (1948), 5
Wash. and Lee L.R. 85, 86.
111. Executive Proclamation No. 2667, September 28, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303
(1945) (reproduced, supra, note 62, 818-19).
112. Executive Order No. 9633, September 28, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12305 (1945);
quoted in Hardwicke, supra, note 107, 404.
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The following month, invoking the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, the United States commenced an action against the
State of California bringing into litigation directly the issue of title
in the three-mile territorial sea adjacent to that state. 113 Meanwhile
in the Congress, a Resolution disclaiming in favour of the coastal
states all interests of the United States in the lands beneath the
three-mile territorial sea, while retaining all rights to the continental
shelf, was introduced and eventually approved. President Trueman
exercised his veto power in relation to this Resolution, however,
and was not overridden by Congress. 1 4 The Supreme Court
delivered its opinion in United States v. California"1 5 sustaining
federal rights in June, 1947. Mr. Justice Black, for the majority,
observed that the question of proprietary rights in the territorial
seabed historically gained significance upon the discovery of oil in
the early 1900's off the California coast. Consequently, that state,
as had others, issued licences, permits and leases in the offshore
zone thereby "pointedly rais[ing] this state-federal conflict
''116
California had defended its claim to ownership primarily117 on
the bases that "its original Constitution, adopted in 1849 before that
state was admitted to the Union, included within the state's
boundary the water area extending three English miles from the
shore"," 8s which limits had been ratified upon Union, and by an
assertion that admission having been granted "on an equal footing,
with the original states in all respects whatever"," 9 the state limits
included the territorial sea if indeed those states possessed it. Did, in
fact and law, the original thirteen states have property rights in their
adjacent territorial seas? The first basis argued by California for
answering in the affirmative necessitated merely an extension of the
rule of state ownership of the bed of inland waters,' 20 a step
declined by the Court. The second, required historical analysis of
113. Hardwicke, supra, note 107, 403.
114. Id., 404; Kuhn, supra, note 110, 86.
115. 67S. Ct. 1658(1947).
116. Id., 1668.
117. The State also pleaded adverse possession, laches, estoppel and resjurdicata.
118. Supra, note 115, 1664.
119. Id.
120. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1844): "the original states owned
in trust for their people the navigable tidewaters between high and low water mark
within each state's boundaries, and the soil under them, as an inseparable attribute
of state sovereignty." (quote supra, note 115, 1664).
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the concept of the territorial sea at Independence in 1776. However,
without such analysis of authority, Black J. was content to express
the bare conclusion that:
From all the wealth of material supplied.., we cannot say that
the thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership to the
three mile belt or the soil under it...
At the time this country won its independence from England there
was no settled international custom or understanding among
nations that each nation owned a three-mile water belt along its
borders .. . [such an] idea .. . was but a nebulous
suggestion.121
Implicitly, even if the Court had been willing to accept the 1849
Constitutional provision as to boundaries, the "equal footing"
provision would have had the effect of depriving California of its
offshore zone.
Rather than individual states, declared Black J., it had been the
nation as a whole which had historically asserted vis a vis other
sovereign states "national dominion over a definite marginal zone
to protect our neutrality. ' 122 This national assertion in relation to
the territorial sea as a buffer zone with other sovereign states was, in
the opinion of Black J., binding upon the Court, notwithstanding
recognition that R. v. Keyn had expressed "considerable doubt in
England (as late as 1876) about its scope and even its existence. "12 3
Accordingly, it was the federal nation which had acquired rights in
the territorial sea. Legislative jurisdiction, it was held, followed
naturally as "a function of national external sovereignty" ' 12 4 over
this geographic area "of vital consequence to the nation in its desire
to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world." 125
The Court, per the majority opinion, granted the United States the
relief requested, namely injunctive relief and a declaration of rights
in the following form:
The United States of America is now, and has been at all times
pertinent hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full
dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things
underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary
low-water mark on the coast of California, and outside of the
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inland waters, extending seaward three nautical miles and
bounded on the north and south, respectively, by the northern and
southern boundaries of the State of California. The State of
California has no title thereto or property interest therein.
126
Similarity between the conclusions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the British Columbia Offshore reference and the United
States Supreme Court in California should be evident. In both there
was negation of property rights in the state or province, but no
positive assertion of property rights in the federation, merely a
declaration of "paramount rights". The significance of such a
declaration as granted by the majority in California was commented
upon by Frankfurter J., in his dissenting opinion in that case: 12 7
An injunction against trespassers normally presupposes property
rights. The Court, however, grants the prayer but does not do so
by finding that the United States has proprietary interests in the
area. . .The Court finds trespass against the United States on the
basis of what it calls the 'national dominion' by the United States
over this area.
In a later opinion, 128 Frankfurther J. placed particular emphasis
upon the fact that the Court in issuing its decree, struck out the
proprietary claim proposed for inclusion in the draft order submitted
by the United States.
Fortified by this success, the federal Attorney-General instituted
additional original actions before the Supreme Court against the
states of Louisiana and Texas, judgments in which were handed
down simultaneously in June, 1950.129
In United States v. Louisiana, the defendant state admitted
federal legislative paramount rights "to the extent of all
governmental powers existing under the Constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States" 130 but claimed that, in the absence of
Congressional legislation asserting federal rights in the offshore
seabed, it was legitimate for the state to control the exploration and
production of resources, in what was claimed as state property. In a
6 to 1 decision, the Court briefly relied upon its judgment in
California as determining that Louisiana enjoyed neither property
nor legislative rights in the territorial sea. Douglas J., for the
majority, reformulated the ratio of the latter case as follows:
126. 68 S. Ct. 20, 21.
127. Supra, note 115, 1669-70.
128. United States v. Louisiana, 70 S. Ct. 914, 917-18 (1950).
129. Id.; United States v. Texas, 70 S. Ct. 918 (1950).
130. Supra, note 128, 915.
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The marginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National
interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are in-
volved. The problems of commerce, national defence, relations
with other powers, war and peace focus there. National rights
must therefore be paramount in that area.
31
United States v. Texas'3 2 provided a slight twist in the argument
favouring the state's position. Texas had entered the Union as a
sovereign Republic enjoying both property rights and jurisdiction
[domimium and imperium] in her territorial sea, defined to a limit of
three leagues from the coast. At Union, it was argued, Texas had
merely transferred "her powers of sovereignty - her imperium -
over the marginal sea to the federation"' 33 and had retained the
property interest or dominium therein. Douglas J., delivering a 4 to
3 majority judgment, was willing to assume the correctness of the
argument as to the rights of Texas prior to Union, but held as
decisive the "equal footing" clause respecting the post-Union
rights of the state.' 34 To be placed on an "equal footing", in light
of California and Louisiana, meant that at union Texas must, of
necessity, have been stripped of any rights it may have enjoyed
previously over its territorial sea. Alternatively, Douglas J., dealt
directly with the argument raised by Texas and attempted in
Louisiana - but not specifically addressed by the Court in that
action - that though the federation may indeed enjoy legislative
jurisdiction, state proprietary interests remained intact. Jurisdic-
tional rights in the territorial sea having developed in the arena of
international relations among sovereign actors, Douglas J. refuted
the state's logic by anchoring or subsuming property rights to
political rights: "[O]nce low-water mark is passed the international
domain is reached. Property rights must then be so subordinated to
political rights as in substance to coalesce and unite in the national
sovereignty.' 1
35
It is interesting to note in respect of these so-called "tidelands"
cases 13 6 the absence of any positive statement of federal proprietary
interests in the orthodox sense. The closest the Court came was in
131. Id., 916.
132. Texas, supra, note 129.
133. Id., 921.
134. Delay (supra, note 110, 120) writing in 1951 noted that the "equal footing"
clause had not been argued before the Court and felt that its application to the state
may have been historically erroreous in relation to Texas' Terms of Union.
135. Supra, note 129, 924.
136. c.f. Delay, supra, note 110, 122.
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the Texas decision, in stating that 'property interests are so
subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow
sovereignty.' '137
Twenty-five years later, in 1975, the Supreme Court was once
again faced with the offshore issue though on this occasion, it could
not fall back on the "equal footing" clause since the defendants
before the Court were the thirteen Atlantic coastal states - Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia and Florida - among which were eleven of the
original states. 138 In this situation, the defendant States invited the
Court to overrule the earlier California, Louisiana and Texas
decision as erroneous in denying the original states' claims to
offshore ownership prior to Union. In a unanimous judgment
delivered by White J. the Court made it clear that even if it was
conceded, which it was not, that the original states did enjoy
property rights in the offshore zone prior to Union, such conclusion
was "not dispositive."' 139 The alternative basis of decision
expounded in the earlier cases, in relation to external sovereign
powers, was held by the Court to govern the issue:
Whatever interest the States might have had immediately prior to
statehood . .. as a matter of 'purely legal principle . . . the
Constitution . . . allotted to the federal government jurisdiction
over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and national defence'...
[I]t necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional law, that as
attributes of these external sovereign powers the federal
government has paramount rights in the marginal sea. 14
0
IV. Australia
In 1974 each of the six States of Australia instituted an action
against the Commonwealth seeking a declaration of constitutional
137. Supra, note 129, 924.
138. United States v. Maine, 95 S.Ct. 1155 (1975). Litigation centered on the
continental shelf in contradistinction to the territorial sea since by the Submerged
Lands Act, 1953 (67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. #1301), Congress had quit-claimed to
coastal states the adjacent seabed within three miles of the shore. Texas had
received its historic three marine leagues.
Connecticut was not made a defendant in Maine since its coastal frontage
comprises Long Island Sound which is considered inland waters. Maine, 95 S. Ct.
1155, 1156 footnote 1. See also United States v. Alaska, 95 S. Ct. 2240 (1975)
where the state's claim to Cook Inlet as a historic bay was rejected by the Supreme
Court on the insufficiency of the evidence.
139. Maine, supra, note 138, 1159.
140. Id., 1159.
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invalidity against the federal Seas and Submerged Lands Act, 141 the
key provisions of which are as follows:
6. It is by this Act declared and enacted that the sovereignty in
respect of the territorial sea, and in respect of the airspace over it
and in respect of its bed and subsoil, is vested in and exercisable
by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth.
11. It is by this Act declared and enacted that the sovereign
rights of Australia as a coastal state in respect of the continental
shelf of Australia, for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources, are vested in and exercisable by the Crown
in right of the Commonwealth.
Appended to the Act as schedules were the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf. This federal initiative ended the co-operative-
federalism compromise of the "mirrored" legislative offshore
regimes, by which the Commonwealth and the States enacted
identical legislative schemes in order to avoid direct litigation over
the juridictional issue. 142
The High Court, in New South Wales v. The Commonwealth, 143
delivered judgment in 1975 upholding the validity of the federal
legislation as an intra vires exercise of the Commonwealth's
legislative jurisdiction over "external affairs" 144 and rejecting State
claims to proprietary and jurisdictional rights in the territorial sea,
by a majority, and in the continental shelf, unanimously, by holding
that the then colonies did not include such areas within their limits at
Union, in 1901. The two dissentient members of the Court (Gibbs
and Stephen J.J.) would have recognized state boundaries as
including the limits of the territorial sea and therefore restricted the
federal legislation to that extent.
In three of the majority opinions, Barwick C.J., McTiernan and
Mason J.J., the juridical nature of the territorial sea was held to
have been determined by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in R.
v. Keyn. Of the other two members of the majority, one, Jacobs J.,
restricted the ratio of the Keyn decision to the issue of the
jurisdiction of the Admiral, while the other, Murphy J., merely
141. 1973 Cth. no. 161.
142. See, A.R. Thompson, "Australia's Offshore Petroleum Common Code"
(1968), 3 U.B.C.L.R. 1; R.D. Lambe, "The Offshore Petroleum Agreement and
Legislation" (1967), 41 Aust. L.J. 453.
143. (1975), 135 C.L.R. 337 (H.C.).
144. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, s. 51
(xxix) (U.K.) (1901).
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referred, in a seemingly approving manner, to the decision but
rested his opinion on other grounds. Both dissentient members of
the Court, Gibbs and Stephen J.J., rejected Keyn as an aberration in
its time from the mainstream of legal thought.
Relying in great measure upon the process of reasoning he had
employed in the earlier case of Bonser v. LaMacchia, 145 Barwick
C.J. viewed the issue as to the extent of colonial boundaries at the
1901 Union as determined by the nature of colonization and the
concomitant establishment of governmental institutions. Coloniza-
tion he defined as having involved no alienation of property or
rights per se but rather "the placing under delegated government
defined areas of land." 1 4 6 The question in issue, therefore, was not
directed to whatever were the residual claims of right in the United
Kingdom but whether the territorial sea and/or continental shelf had
been included within the defined limits of the then colonies. 147 The
colonists having brought with them the common law, the territorial
extent of the colony and the jurisdiction of the common law were,
on the authority of R. v. Keyn, co-extensive to the low-water mark:
"Thus, property and power over the territorial seas could not have
come by the common law."'148 Barwick C.J. turned his attention to
the transfer of the casual and territorial revenues which had occurred
upon responsible government. A brief review of the legislative
history of relevant Imperial legislation in relation to "wastelands"
led Barwick C.J. to state two negative propositions. The first, that
the terms of the legislation were such as to include only onshore
land (which result alone would have left open the question of
Imperial rights to the offshore) thus negating not only the
proposition that the territorial sea was within the limits of the colony
but also that such areas were within the "waste lands' of the Crown.
Secondly, the existence of such onshore legislation demonstrated
that at no earlier time had offshore rights been granted the colony
since, in his view, "to have given proprietary or legislative rights
over part of the sea and seabed whilst denying any right or power in
the disposal of the land would have been absurd. '" 149 There being
no further Imperial legislation concerning the limits of the colonies,
145. (1970), 122 C.L.R. 177 (H.C.).
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they accordingly remained static at the low-water mark until 1901
and so entered the federation.
In seeking to establish positive Commonwealth rights, Barwick
C.J. commenced this stage of his analysis with the proposition that
any rights in the territorial sea, which developed at international law
over time, accrued to the United Kingdom not only in relation to her
own limits but also relative to her far-flung, dependent
territories. 150 In his view, this guiding principle was the sense in
which the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 "was
conceived and enacted."' 151 These rights, attaching as incidents to
"independant national status", "in due time passed to Australia as
the nation state." ' 152 Accordingly, only upon secession from the
federation, would a then-sovereign state acquire its own marginal
seas. 15
3
Alternatively, Barwick C.J. was prepared to deny state offshore
rights even upon the assumption that the states had enjoyed both
proprietary and jurisdictional rights in the offshore zone during the
colonial period. Finding support in the California, Texas, Louisiana
and Maine decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
British Columbia decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Barwick C.J. held that:
A consequence of creation of the Commonwealth under the
Constitution . . . was, in my opinion, to vest in the
Commonwealth any proprietary rights and legislative powers
which the colonies might have had in or in relation to the
territorial sea, seabed and airspace and continental shelf and
incline. Proprietary rights and legislative powers in these matters
of international concern would then coalesce and unite in the
nation. 15
4
This result conforms, in my opinion, to an essential feature of a
federation, namely, that it is the nation and not the integers of the
federation which must have the power to protect and control as a
national function the area of the marginal seas... 155
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Another of the majority, Jacobs J. did not concede it as "strictly
necessary to decide in R. v. Keyn whether the Crown of England
owned the sea or any part thereof below low-water mark and not
intra fauces terrae. The important point was that the common law
did not extend there."'1 57 Obviously, by accepting the premise that
the common law did not extend below low-water mark, Jacobs J.
had to offer an alternative basis for the exercise of rights over the
marginal zones independent of the common law. His alternative was
the royal prerogative being transferred, upon the attainment of
responsible government, to the King in Right of the particular
colony, as opposed to remaining exercisable in Right of the United
Kingdom. Rights in the marginal zones being in essence an
assertion of sovereignty, the answer was clear that no such transfer
had taken place respecting the pre-Union colonies. However,
notwithstanding that individual states had not acquired such rights,
the Commonwealth, as an evolved independent nation had acquired
that royal prerogative at some point following World War I. In this
reasoning, Jacobs J. mirrored Barwick C.J.
Unfortunately, Gibbs J., in a dissenting opinion, in referring to
judicial authorities for the proposition that at common law there
existed crown seabed ownership, did not distinguish between those
dealing with inland waters and those not. Rather, he relied for such
a broad statement of principle upon the very cases distinguished on
that basis by Cockburn C.J. in Keyn and by the Supreme Court of
Canada in British Columbia Offshore. Gibbs J. further categorically
rejected the conclusions of Cockburn C.J. by asserting "that if the
rule as to the Crown's ownership of the seabed was originally based
on the doctrine that the Crown had sovereignty over the narrow
seas, it survived the demise of that doctrine, and the three-mile limit
came to be the limit of the Crown's property."' 58 To find that the
territorial sea had been within the limits of a colony at Union, Gibbs
J. accepted alternatively either that the "waste lands" legislation
was phrased widely enough to have included the marginal seabed in
the transfers,' 59 or, notwithstanding the assumption that the letters
patent creating the colonies had not expressly included the territorial
sea, that upon the grant of responsible government the Crown in
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second alternative basis was accepted by the other dissentient
member of the Court, Stephen J.161
One very important argument in favour of state offshore
jurisdictional and proprietary rights, advanced in New South Wales
and alluded to in the British Columbia Offshore reference, remains
to be considered - the significance of seemingly extra-territorial
colonial legislation regulating aspects of the offshore. It was a
fundamental constitutional premise that colonial legislatures were
jurisdictionally incompetent beyond their territorial limits until, at
least, the Statue of Westminster, 1931162 removed that incapacity.
How then could colonial legislation regulating, for instance, the
offshore fishery be upheld as constitutionally valid unless the
offshore zone was within the limits of the colony?
This argument was advanced and dealt with authoritatively in
the brief judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Lord
MacMillan in Croft v. Dunphy.163 In 1929, pursuant to federal
customs legislation, the Canadian registered vessel of the
respondent, which had been found "hovering" 111/2 miles off the
coast of Nova Scotia, was seized with its cargo of rum by customs
authorities. Before the Supreme Court of Canada,1 64 it had been
held by a majority that the subject legislation was ultra vires as
being extra-territorial in effect. However, Lord MacMillan
reviewed the historical content of the customs legislation of the
United Kingdom and noted similar provisions having extra-
territorial effect, strictly so-called. Consequently, in his Lordship's
view, when the Imperial Parliament by the Constitution Act, 1867
empowered the federal Parliament to legislate in relation to
customs, it must have been intended to confer as complete a
jurisdiction as
necessary to render anti-smuggling legislation effective. In these
circumstances it is difficult to conceive that the Imperial
Parliament . . . should have withheld . . . the power to enact
provisions similar in scope to those which had long been an
integral part of Imperial customs legislation and which
presumably were regarded as necessary to its efficacy. 165
161. Id., 440.
162. 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, s. 3 (U.K.).
163. [1933] A.C. 156 (P.C.) (N.S.).
164. [1931]S.C.R. 531.
165. Supra, note 163, 166-67.
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Though in context dealing with customs legislation, the reasoning
of Lord MacMillan in Croft v. Dunphy can not be restricted solely
to that subject but, as noted in the judgment, relates also to the
exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the general power for "peace,
order and good government and any other enumerated subject
matter."1
66
In New South Wales, all majority members of the Court who
considered this argument accepted that apparently extra-territorial
legislation enacted by colonial legislatures, possessing as they did
power to legislate for the "peace, order and good government" of
the colony, was justifiable on the basis of Croft v. Dunphy, as a
valid exercise of the power.167 Gibbs J., in dissent, however, would
not have so rationalized all such colonial legislation. Accepting that
control of navigation, regulation of fishing, grant of oyster leases,
customs and various related matters could be so rationalized, Gibbs
J. could not, however, logically apply the doctrine of extra-
territorial incompetence and justify a licensing requirement for
foreigners fishing within the territorial sea, an illustration for which
he does not cite legislation.' 68
Continental Shelf
In British Columbia Offshore, the Supreme Court of Canada
having denied the province's claim to the territorial sea perfunctor-
ily rejected its claim to the shelf stating, "as with the territorial sea,
so with the continental shelf."' 69 The Court did, however, note that
as late as 1939, it had been stated by Lord Asquith that continental
shelf rights did "not exist as a legal doctrine. 170 In New South
Wales the issues relating to rights in the shelf received similar
cursory treatment by the majority.'.7 However, Gibbs J., in dissent,
examined in greater detail the doctrine of the continental shelf. The
states had based their contentions on the following passage from the
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North Seas
Continental Shelf Cases:
166. Id., 163.
167. Supra, note 143, 468-69 per Mason J.; 495 per Jacobs J.; cf. 371 per Barwick
C.J. See also Bonser v. LaMacchia, supra, note 145, 186 per Barwick C.J.; 207
per Kitto J.; 225 per Windeyer J.
168. Supra, note 143, 404-05.
169. Supra, note 62, 821.
170. Abu Dhabi Arbitration (1952), 1 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 247 quoted supra, note
143, 817.
171. E.G. supra, note 143, 472 per Mason J.
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the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of the
continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land
territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land and as an extension of it in
an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the
seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here
an inherent right . . . its existence can be declared (and many
states have done this) but does not need to be constituted.
Furthermore, the right does not depend on its being exercised.
172
While recognizing the appeal of this ipso facto, ab initio argument,
Gibbs J. rejected its applicability in a municipal forum. While such
doctrine
may or may not be correct as a matter of legal theory . . . the
rights now recognize represent the response of international law
to modern developments of science and technology . . . In this
matter the arguments of history are stronger than those of logic
.. . When those rights were recognized by international law the
Commonwealth was the international person entitled to assert
them and did so.
173
Once again, it is to be noted that the opinions delivered in New
South Wales do not particularly assert federal proprietary interests in
the territorial sea and seabed, or shelf but rather "sovereignty" in
relation to the former and "sovereign rights" to the latter.1
74
V. Newfoundland
In a per curiam judgment delivered 17 February 1983, the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Reference Re: Offshore Mineral
Rights of Newfoundland, 175 certified in answer to the questions
submitted by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council that the seabed
and subsoil of the territorial sea were vested in and belong to the
province, but that the more significant rights to the continental shelf
do not. In arriving at these conclusions, currently under review by
the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court enunciated a series of
fundamental propositions pertaining to the capacity and status of
pre-Confederation Newfoundland, the nature of the Statute of
172. I.C.J. Reports 1969, 3 at para 19.
173. Supra, note 143, 416; see also, 457 per Stephen J. "Into this vacuum stepped
the Commonwealth".
174. per Seas and Submerged Lands Act, 1973, supra, note 137, ss. 6, 11;
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Continuous Zone, articles 1, 2;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 1.
175. Supra, note 3.
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Westminster, 1931, and the constitutional effects of Commission of
Government and Union with Canada. It is these propositions
leading to what is submitted is an erroneous conclusion with respect
to the territorial sea that the following analysis will seek to critically
evaluate.
(1) Geographic Limits
Newfoundland entered the Canadian federation "immediately
before the expiration of the thirty-first day of March, 1949
.... ,"176 As with other post-1867 provinces, the Constitution
Act, 1867, as amended, was made applicable to Newfoundland,
subject to the paramountcy of the actual Terms of Union.
177
Accordingly, s.109 of that Act, by which "All Lands, Mines,
Minerals and Royalties belonging to . . ." the province at the date
of Union are confirmed in provincial ownership, would have been
applicable to Newfoundland except for Term 37 which, for present
purposes, expressly reproduced s. 109 mutatis mutandis. Therefore,
while constitutionally s. 109 does not extend to Newfoundland, that
province is in the same position with respect to its "Lands, Mines,
Minerals and Royalties" as the original provinces. Therefore, if at
the date of Union the territorial sea, continental shelf or both
"belonged" to Newfoundland, they would so belong today. In
contradistinction to the American constitutional decisions discus-
sed, there is no equivalent "equal footing" clause in the Canadian
context which could be invoked by Courts to justify a reduction in
the territorial extent of Newfoundland, in forced conformity or
equality with sister provinces. 
178
What were the territorial limits of Newfoundland in 1949?
Term 2 defined the limits of the province as follows:
The Province of Newfoundland shall comprise the same territory
as at the date of Union, that is to say, the island of Newfoundland
and the islands adjacent thereto, the Coast of Labrador as
delimited in the report delivered by the Judicial Committee of His
Majesty's Privy Council on the first day of March, 1927, and
approved by His Majesty in His Privy Council on the
176. Terms of Union, para. 50, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix 11, No. 30; R.S.N. 1970,
Appendix, No. 5.
177. Id., para. 3.
178. This point was argued by Counsel for the Attorney-General for Canada but
rejected by the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, slip judgment p. 51.
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twenty-second day of March, 1927, and the islands adjacent to
the said Coast of Labrador.
1 79
Letters Patent issued in 1867 had constituted a Governor "in and
over Our Island of Newfoundland, and the islands adjacent, and all
the coast of Labrador . . .and all the islands adjacent . "..."180
Are such descriptions sufficient to include the territorial sea and
continental shelf? Stephen J. in New South Wales regarded the
actual wording of colonial boundaries as immaterial. In his view,
having rejected R. v. Keyn as an authority, sovereignty of the seas
and seabed naturally accrued to the coastal colony by virtue of the
land mass, regardless of the metes and bounds description.181 On
the other hand Barwick C.J. 182 and Jacobs J.1S3 in that case, and the
Supreme Court of Canada in the British Columbia Offshore
Reference (the stated boundary of British Columbia being the
"Pacific Ocean"), having accepted the authority of Keyn, would
consequently deny any offshore interest to Newfoundland solely on
the basis of the limits defined.
This latter view is the approach mirrored by the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court, in the British Columbia
Offshore Reference, having expressly accepted the majority
reasoning of Keyn and rejected the minority reasoning in New South
Wales, the principle of stare decisis foreclosed serious questioning
of the point by the Court of Appeal. The Court acknowledged, as a
starting point in its analysis, that as of 1871 (the date of British
Columbia Confederation) the geographic limits of a colony were
fixed at low water mark and that the boundary descriptions
contained in the Letters Patent of the province referred to definite
areas of land and did not include the territorial sea. 184
(2) Status and Capacity
Term of Union 7 is headed "Provincial Constitution" and is as
follows:
179. Id., para. 2.
180. R.S.N. 1970, Appendix No. 1. The 1610 Crown Charter was framed in terms
of "seas and islands lying within ten leagues of any part of the sea coast" per
Report of Albert B. Maris, Special Master at 48, United States v. Maine supra,
note 134, cited in J.T. Ippolito, "Newfoundland and the Continental Shelf: From
Cod to Oil and Gas" (1976), 15 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 138, 144.
181. Supra, note 143, 441.
182. Id., 369-70.
183. Id., 484.
184. Supra, note 3, slip judgment pp. 18, 28.
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The Constitution of Newfoundland as it existed immediately
prior to the sixteenth day of February, 1934, is revived at the date
of Union and shall, subject to these Terms and the [Constitution]
Acts, 1867 to 1946, continue as the Constitution of the Province
of Newfoundland from and after the date of Union, until altered
under the authority of the said Acts. 
185
What is the constitutional significance of this Term? Did
Newfoundland enter the Canadian federation as a reconstituted,
though momentary sovereign Dominion as the reference to its
constitution of 1934 might seemingly indicate?
Explaining this provision in the House of Commons, then Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent stated:
The delegation from Newfoundland and its law officers insisted
that they did not want the province of Newfoundland to get a new
constitution out of the union. They wanted to be in the position of
the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which had
constitutions before union and retained all the powers of their
constitutions, except those given to the central authority. It was
for that reason that the dean of the law school was insistent upon
having the constitution revived an instant before union becomes
effective. It will be revived only because there will have been
enacted an act by the United Kingdom agreeing to this. 1
86
In the dawn of the nuclear age, it was perhaps quite natural and
attractive to mentally envisage Newfoundland momentarily throw-
ing off the shackles of the Commission of Government which had
existed from 1934 to 1949 and grasping the mantel of sovereign
status before entering into the Union with Canada. If accepted, it
must be recognized that along with sovereign status adhere the
attributes of sovereignty - more particularly, the rights of the
international actor in relation to the territorial sea and continental
shelf.
Canada, the Supreme Court had indicated, 187 became a sovereign
state at some nebulous point in time between 1919 and the Statute of
Westminster, 1931. In the British Columbia Offshore reference, the
Court noted particularly the evolution from federal legislative
reference to "British Waters" in 1868 to "territorial waters of
Canada" in 1928.188 Undeniably, in the view of one
185. Supra, note 176.
186. Debates, House of Commons, Sess. 1944, Vol. 1, 364 (emphasis added).
187. Supra, note 62, 816.
188. Id., 806.
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commentator, 189 any recognition of sovereignty in respect of
Canada prior to 1931 must be of equal application to the then sister
Dominion of Newfoundland.
Recognizing that sovereignty was evolved in the various
"Dominions", it is necessary to define terms to determine if
Newfoundland could have been sovereign notwithstanding non-
adoption of the Statute of Westminster, 1931. In Duff Development
Co. v. Government of Kelantan, 190 Viscount Finley, referring to the
status of the respondent, stated:
It is obvious that for sovereignty there must be a certain amount
of independence, but it is not in the least necessary that for
sovereignty there should be complete independence. It is quite
consistent with sovereignty that the sovereign may in certain
respects be dependent upon another power; the control, for
instance, of foreign affairs may be completely in the hands of a
protecting Power, and there may be agreements or treaties which
limit the powers of the sovereign even in internal affairs without
entailing a loss of the position of a sovereign Power.191
The circumstances before the court which the appellant
contended negated the sovereign status of Kelantan were that the
foreign relations of that country were conducted through the United
Kingdom and that internal affairs were regulated upon the advice of
a British advisor. The House of Lords held that the formal
acknowledgment of sovereignty by the Secretary of State was
conclusive. There is, in relating this case as a precedent for
Newfoundland, an obvious distinction in that Kelantan was an
independent sovereign nation in all senses prior to British
involvement, whereas Newfoundland had no prior independent
existence beyond that evolved from the United Kingdom. With that
caveat in mind, the statement of Viscount Finlay does go far in
supporting sovereignty in Newfoundland, through a very liberal
construction of that term, notwithstanding non-adoption of the
Statute of Westminster, 1931.
Assuming such a proposition to be correct, what is its
significance in municipal as opposed to international law?
Conceding that the Statute of Westminster, 1931 was declaratory in
this respect, it remains that it was merely declaratory of the
189. C. Martin, Newfoundland's Case on Offshore Minerals: A Brief Outline
(1975), 7 Ott. L.R. 34, 38.
190. [1924) A.C. 797.
191. Id., 814.
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international status of the countries involved. In municipal
constitutional law, the Statute of Westminster, 1931 must be
considered constitutive. This characterization is borne out of the
obvious distinction between the pre- and post-1931 attempts by
the Canadian Parliament to abolish appeals to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. The pre-1931 legislation was
reviewed and invalidated by the Privy Council in Nadan v. The
King.192 On the determination that there existed a conflict with
existing Imperial legislation, the Canadian legislation in issue was
held to be void pursuant to the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. 193
The legislation was also held invalid because of its purported
extra-territorial effect. These two alternative incapacities having
been cured by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, the post-1931
Canadian legislation was upheld in British Coal Corp. v. The
King.194 It would, accordingly, by counter to these authorities to
assert that the Statute of Westminster, 1931, was merely declaratory
for municipal constitutional purposes.
If constitutive, what effect did the Statute of Westminster, 1931
have on Newfoundland? Section 10 of that Act specifically withheld
application of anything but essentially the preamble and definition
section in respect of Newfoundland "unless . . . adopted by the
Parliament of the Dominion". Newfoundland at no time having
adopted the Act, accordingly, acquired neither exemption from the
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865195 nor extra-territorial legislative
jurisdiction. 196 Explicitly, however, by virtue of the definition
section, Newfoundland was recognized as an equal Dominion with
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free
State for the purposes of the Act. To none of these "Dominions"
did the Act expressly transfer sovereignty or sovereign rights, but
rather some of the attributes of sovereignty in a municipal
constitutional sense.
Assuming, in the alternative, that the Statute of Westminster,
1931 was merely declaratory of a pre-existing international
capacity, it must be conceded that, as with Canada, Newfoundland
enjoyed sovereign status and the attributes thereof prior to 1931.
192. [1926] A.C. 482.
193. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63 (U.K.).
194. [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.); see, Attorney General for Ontario V. Attorney
Generalfor Canada (Privy Council Appeals Case), [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).
195. Pursuant to s. 2 of the Act, supra, note 162.
196. Id., s. 3.
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This conclusion must necessarily result since, as the Newfoundland
Legislature enjoyed full legislative jurisdiction to make laws for
"the public peace, welfare and good government"' 197 of the
Colony, there existed no fundamental distinction between the
relative capacities of Canada and Newfoundland during the
pre-1931 period.
This latter view is the approach adopted by the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 in their view,
was not constitutive but merely declaratory of the "established
position" of the Dominions, per the preamble to the Act, and
"adjusted the legal forms to comply with the established principles
of autonomy and equality.' 1 98 Consequently, nonadoption by
Newfoundland was irrelevant to its status and capacity as a
sovereign Dominion. The Court further cites the decision of the
Australian High Court in R. v. Burgess ex parte Henry, 199 a case
dealing with the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal Parliament
to enact legislation implementing the 1919 Aerial Navigation
Convention, to buttress its position. In that case, Evatt and
McTiernan J.J., in ajoint concurring opinion stated:
The funadmental declaration of 1926 dealing with the status both
of Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions included the
assertion that they were 'equal in status, in no way subordinate
one to another in any respect of their domestic or external
affairs'. (Cnd. 2768, sec. 11). It would be a complete derogation
from such status if this court were to hold that the
Commonwealth was not competent to assume the obligations
imposed, and to accept the rights conferred, by the Convention of
1919... 200
It is to be noted, however, that "Commonwealth" is not a reference
to Australia as a sovereign Dominion but rather to the federal
juristic Unit. The issue before the Court centered not on
sovereignty, but on the legislative jurisdiction of the federal
Parliament in relation to "external affairs". The legislation in issue
was upheld as a valid exercise of the "external affairs" jurisdiction
of Parliament and the cited quote refers to the federal executive's
authority as a signatory to the international Convention. Conse-
quently, the value of the precedent notwithstanding its context of
197. Supra, note 180, art. 5.
198. Supra, note 3, slip judgment p. 31.
199. (1936). 55 C.L.R. 608.
200. Id., pp. 683-84.
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non-adoption of the Statute of Westminster, 1931 by Australia, is
considerably weakened.
(3) Commission of Government:
Unfortunate economic conditions forced the drastic measure of
suspension of the Legislature of Newfoundland and the Letters
Patent Constituting the Government of Newfoundland, and their
substitution by a Commission of Government in 1934.201 What was
the status of Newfoundland in international law during the period of
Commission of Government 1934-49? There are naturally two
opposing views: (a) sovereignty reverted to the United Kingdom
due to the loss of the attributes of an independent nation20 2 and
(b) in conformity with Duff Development Co. and accepted by the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal, Commission of Government did
not involve an alteration in the de jure status of Newfoundland as a
sovereign state, but rather merely a change in internal
administration. 20 3 If the former view is correct, Term 7 takes on an
exaggerated significance if it can be concluded that pursuant to that
provision, Newfoundland reacquired the attributes of a sovereign
status so as to have entered into Union with Canada enjoying its
territorial sea, the continental shelf or both within its territorial
limits.
Did in fact, as Prime Minister St. Laurent asserted, Term 7 revive
"an instant before union becomes effective" the pre-1934
Constitution of Newfoundland? And if so, to what extent? This
magic moment can only have existed for Newfoundland to have
reacquired sovereign status, if it can be shown that the Terms
themselves allowed some momentary lapse during which this
occurred, or that it was deemed to have occurred by necessary
intendment.
201. Address of Newfoundland, S.N. 1933 (2nd Sess.). Newfoundland Act, 24 &
25 Geo. 5, c. 2 (1933) (U.K.); Letters Patent in S.N. 1933 (2nd Sess.).
202. "The true position in law... after the 1933 statute had been passed was that
the United Kingdom Parliament enjoyed complete sovereignty, unfettered
sovereignty, over Newfoundland and that Newfoundland, although in name a
Dominion, was in fact a Colony "per the Attorney General, 462 Parl. Deb., H.C.
(5th Ser.) 1265, 1266 (1949), quoted in Ippolito, note 174, 160; C. Douglas,
"Conflicting Claims to Oil and Natural Gas Resources off the Eastern Coast of
Canada" (1980), 18 Alta. L.R. 54, 65.
203. See also Martin, supra, note 189, 40; Ippolito, supra, note 180, 156; N.J.
Inions, "Newfoundland Offshore Claims" (1981), 19 Alta. L.R. 461, 467.
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Term 7 provides for a revival of the pre-1934 Constitution "at the
date of Union". 204 This latter phrase is defined in Term 1 to mean
"On, from and after the coming into force of these Terms", which
in turn is established by Term 50 to be "immediately before the
expiration of the thirty-first day of March, 1949". On a strict
construction of these provisions, the revival of the constitution "at
the date of Union" occurred simultaneously with the coming into
force of the Terms. There was no magic moment contrary to
conventional wisdom.
20 5
Putting aside such mystical inquiries, does the construction of
Term 7 alone necessarily involve a revival of sovereign status?
Cabot Martin, writing in support of Newfoundland's claim to the
offshore resources, would construe the Term as reviving the
complete constitutional framework of the pre-1934 Dominion.
20 6
J.T. Ippolito takes a different approach arguing that the Term serves
"only to specify which legal document was to serve as the
Constitution of the new Province." '20 7 Undoubtedly, if the wording
of the Term had ended after merely reviving the pre-1934
Constitution, Cabot Martin would have a very strong argument, in
fact perhaps unassailable. However, the Term does not so conclude
but proceeds to provide that, subject to the "Terms and the
[Constitution] Acts, 1867 to 1946... [such revived constitution
shall] . . . continue as the Constitution of the Province of
Newfoundland...",. 20 8 It is obvious that Newfoundland could not
simultaneously enjoy both the Constitution of its Dominion status
and that of its new status as a Canadian province. Term 7 should not
be so interpreted. Rather, in context, it is the internal constitutional
framework which was intended to be revived for the purpose of
re-establishing the Newfoundland parliamentary system of
government.20 9 It is this latter view which was adopted by the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal, which stated: "The effect of [Term
7] was to restore Responsible Government to Newfoundland, but as
a Province of Canada. The plenary powers previously exercisable
by Newfoundland as a unitary State were divided between the
204. Supra, note 176 (emphasis added).
205. Contra, Martin, supra, note 189, 41.
206. Id., 40 (dejure status never having been lost).
207. Ippolito, supra, note 180, 161.
208. Term 7, supra, note 176.
209. This would seem to be supported by Term 14.
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constituent parts of the federation by the [Constitution] Act
1867.''210
If Commission of Government involved a revocation of
sovereignty and such was not revived by the Terms of Union,
Newfoundland did not enter the Canadian federation as a sovereign
state and could not have enjoyed the attributes of sovereignty, at
least as regards the continental shelf since that doctrine did not
develop until subsequent to Commission of Government.211
Newfoundland would be left to argue, as did the states
unsuccessfully in New South Wales, on the basis of rights ipsofacto
and ab initio per the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases decision. 212
Before a municipal tribunal where a real conflict exists as to the
very existence of rights in one jurisdiction as opposed to another, it
is very doubtful that this doctrinal proposition, stated in the context
of an arbitration involving no dispute as to the existence of such
rights but merely the geographic limits between neighboring states,
would be accepted and applied. Rather, such a tribunal would, as
did the High Court of New South Wales, recognize that such rights
in the continental shelf are of modern origin. As to the territorial
sea, it being generally accepted as a doctrine prior to 1934,
Newfoundland could successfully establish its capacity as a
sovereign state to have acquired such rights as recognized by
international law. 2 13 Argued before the Court of Appeal, the ipso
facto, ab initio argument was rejected as a "rationalization of rights
over the continental shelf recognized by international law. It cannot
be taken as declaratory of rights under the municipal law of a State
at any given time." 214 Additionally, the Court interpreted ipsofacto
and ab initio as referring not to the dawn of geophysical time but
rather "when these areas became the object of active interest of
states." ' 215 This view was held to be "the most logical and is in
accord with British practice at the time." 2 16
If Newfoundland did not lose its sovereignty upon Commission
of Government, or Term 7 resurrected that sovereign status
immediately prior to Union, or the ipso facto, ab initio argument is
210. Supra, note 3, slip judgment p. 50.
211. Abu Dhabi Arbitration, supra, note 170.
212. Supra, note 172.
213. Martin, supra, note 189, 38.
214. Supra, note 3, slip judgment p. 65.
215. Id., p. 64.
216. Id.
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accepted, Newfoundland may have some basis for its position that
both the territorial sea and the continental shelf were, and are,
within its territory and jurisdiction. At this juncture, debate
obviously centers on analysis as to the point in time at which the
doctrine of the continental shelf became recognized in international
law. Commentators 217 have already entered this debate with careful
analysis of the bilateral division of the shelf zone in the Gulf of
Paria by the United Kingdom and Venezuela in 1942, the Trueman
Proclamation of 1945, Lord Asquith's conclusions in theAbu Dhabi
Arbitration of 1952,218 the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf, the ipsofacto and ab initio argument of the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, and the actual assertions by various
states of continental shelf rights.
219
All of this careful analysis is made irrelevant if Newfoundland
either did not assert territorial ownership of the offshore zones, or
such rights, as recognized by international law, are not such as to
import ownership of territory, in a sense such that the offshore
zones can be said to "belong" to Newfoundland, in accordance
with Term 37, as "lands, mines, minerals and royalties". The first
alternative, it is submitted, requires a review of Newfoundland's
statutory instruments to determine whether or not that province, qua
colony or Dominion, asserted such rights in the offshore zone as
inconsistent with any other explanation but that Newfoundland
asserted ownership of the solum of the contiguous seabed. Having
framed the issue so narrowly, it must be noted that it is at this
critical juncture that the severest differences arise with the judgment
of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal. That Court illustrated, as an
exercise of dominion over the seabed and subsoil of the territorial
sea, five instances of Newfoundland legislation: (a) the Air
217. Harrison, supra, note 66, 491-93; Martin, supra, note 189, 35-43; Ippolito,
supra, note 180, 147-152; Inions, supra, note 203, 470-74; G.S. Swan, The
Newfoundland Offshore Claims: Interface of Constitutional Federalism and
International Law (1976), 22 McGill L.J. 541, 560-63; H.W. MacLaughlin,
Newfoundland's Continental Shelf: The Jurisdictional Issue (1981), 30 U.N.B.L.J.
91, 94-98.
218. Supra, note 170, 256 "1 am of the opinion that there are in this field so many
ragged ends and unfilled blanks, so much that is merely tentative and exploratory,
that in no form can the doctrine claim as yet to have assumed hitherto the hard
lineaments or the definitive status of an established rule of international law".
219. Mexico, 1945; Argentina and Panama, 1946; Chile and Peru, 1947; Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Bahamas and Jamaica, 1948 - MacLaughlin, supra,
note 217, 95.
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Navigation Act, 1929,220 (b) the 1916 consolidated Customs Act2 2 1
as amended, (c) the Customs Act, 1933,222 (d) the Customs and
Excise Act 1938,223 and (e) the Crown Lands Act, 1930.224
However, the Court was satisfied to assert provincial dominion
without the benefit of critical examination.
22 5
Noting that the Supreme Court of Canada in the British Columbia
Offshore reference regarded federal govering legislation as
inconsistent with provincial possession of the solum of the territorial
sea,22 6 one commentator concluded that, conversely, provincial
hovering legislation "would help to establish that a colony may
have possessed as part of its territory the solum of the territorial
sea".227 That the Legislature of Newfoundland had enacted
hovering legislation is undeniable.228 Nor can it be denied that the
legislature also promulgated specific rules regulating the taking of
lobster229 and for the cultivation of oysters, for which latter
purpose, the Governor in Council might "issue leases or free grants
of any coves, creeks, parts of the coast, lakes, rivers, or banks of
this colony".230 As well, the Customs Act of 1933 described the
adjacent marginal sea not as previously, 231 as "British waters", but
as the "territorial waters of Newfoundland". 232 Bearing in mind
that the present argument centers on the extra-territorial incompe-
tence of the pre-1931 Legislature, all of this legislation can be
justified on the basis of the legislative competence to make laws for
the "public peace, welfare and good government" of the colony.
As held in Croft v. Dunphy, 233 the colonial legislature had full
220. S.N. 1929, c. 15.
221. C.S.N. 1916, c. 22as amended.
222. S.N. 1933, c. 57.
223. S.N. 1938, c. 9.
224. S.N. 1930, c. 15.
225. Supra, note 3, slip judgment pp. 39-42.
226. Supra, note 62, 806.
227. Swan, supra, note 217, 550.
228. Foreign Fishing Vessels Act, 56 Vict., c. 6 (1893); 5 Edw. 7, c. 4 (1905); 6
Edw. 7, c. 1 (1906) (Nfld.). See Swan, supra, note 217, 549-50; Ippolito, supra,
note 180, 145-56; G.V. LaForest, Natural Resources and Public Property Under
the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 101-02.
229. Lobster Industry and Cod-fishing Rules, 53 Vict., s. 8 (1890) (Nfld.); cited
in, Ippolito, supra, note 180, 146.
230. Propagation and Protection of Oysters Act, C.S.N. 1892, c. 128, s. 1;
C.S.N. 1916, c. 165, s. 1.
23 1. Foreign Fishing Vessels Act, supra, note 228.
232. Supra, note 163.
233. Supra, note 163.
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jurisdiction in relation to the normal subject matters conferred upon
it, hence customs and fishery legislation. The legislation cited by
the Court of Appeal, it must be remembered, is specific purpose
legislation providing in the case of customs legislation a definition
of territorial waters for purposes of the customs. The relevance of
the aerial navigation legislation to an assertion of dominion,
respecting the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea, is severely
weakened when the purpose and wording of the legislation
controlling air traffic in the air zone above the land mass and
territorial sea is considered.
Nor do the provisions of the Crown Lands Act, 23 4 allowing
application for licences and leases at a location "covered by the sea
or public tidal waters", and the 1907 grant of seabed "one hundred
feet in width under the straits of Belle Isle for the construction of a
tunnel between Newfoundland and Labrador" ,235 involve a general
claim or assertion in relation to the territorial sea or shelf. Rather,
each is referrable to the accepted doctrine of ownership of the
seabed, even extra fauces terrae, by actual physical appropriation
such as mining.
236
The conclusion is therefore open to be drawn that Newfoundland
did not positively assert rights in relation to the territorial sea or
continental shelf.
Assuming, in the alternative and as concluded by the Court of
Appeal, that Newfoundland did assert such rights as recognized at
international law or, that during that magic moment prior to Union,
if it existed, Newfoundland gained the attributes of sovereignty in
relation to the territorial sea and shelf (as then understood), are
those rights such as to import ownership so as to be reserved by
Term 37 as "lands, mines, minerals and royalties" belonging to the
province?23
7
It is at this point that the Newfoundland Court of Appeal utilizes
basic interpretative doctrines in support of the provincial position.
Seizing upon a difference in wording between Term of Union 37
and s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, both of which confirm
provincial ownership of "lands, mines and minerals" but vary in
234. S.N. 1903, c. 6, s. 49; S.N. 1930, c. 15, ss. 168, 170.
235. Atlantic Steam Service Act, S.N. 1907, c. 15 (Nfld.); Ippolito, supra, note
180, 146.
236. Head, supra, note 99, 149.
237. See, A.J. Kovach, "An Assessment of the Merits of Newfoundland's Claim
to Offshore Mineral Resources: (1975), 23 Chitty's L.J. 18.
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that the former omits the phrase "in which the same are situate",
the Court states:
The significant difference between Term 37 and Section 109 is
the omission of any language from Term 37 confining the
resources reserved to Newfoundland to those found within its
boundaries as defined in Term 2. The presumption is that words
are not omitted, when they have been used in a corresponding
clause in an earlier statute, without a reason. To give effect to
Term 37, then it must be construed as a variation of Section
109. . . having the effect of reserving to the Province of
Newfoundland all proprietary rights both within and outside the
land mass described in Term 2.238
The logic of this conclusion, it is submitted, should not be readily
accepted. On a plain reading of the two provisions, the obvious
office of the wording differential is to territorially limit ownership
within the confines of provincial boundaries due to the multiple
provinces involved in s. 109 as opposed to the single province in
Term 37. Of significance, however, is the Court's acknowledgment
that it is "proprietary" rights which were reserved to the province.
Again, what is the sense of "proprietary rights" which "belong" to
the province?
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone extended the sovereignty of the coastal state into
the belt of the sea, the airspace above and the seabed below. 2 39 The
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the rights
of coastal states as "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it
and exploiting its natural resources" .240 At the moment of Union,
therefore, Newfoundland enjoyed presumably "sovereignty" and
"sovereign rights" in the offshore zones. It is indisputable that
neither the Legislature nor the Commission of Government
positively asserted such rights prior to Union by domestic
legislation.
One may well argue, as does one commentator, 24 1 that
sovereignty at international law may now be equivalent to
ownership in the common law sense. Consistently with this view,
another commentator referred to the nature of rights over a defined
territory exercised by a state as territorial sovereignty:
238. Supra, note 3, slip judgment pp. 54-55.
239. Articles 1, 2.
240. Article 2.1.
241. O'Connell, supra, note 6, 215.
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At the basis of international law lies the notion that a state
occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth, within which it
normally exercises, subject to the limitations imposed by
international law, jurisdiction over persons and things to the
exclusion of jurisdiction of other states . . . Territorial
sovereignty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in private
law. ..242
However, that may be accepted in the realm of international law, it
is another matter in the realm of municipal constitutional law where
the fundamental question, as to which level of the federal state
exercises sovereignty in relation to the offshore, will be determined.
In concert with the United States Supreme Court in the
"tidelands" cases and with Barwick C.J. and Murphy J. in New
South Wales, it is open to conclude that at Union, the sovereign
rights relating to the offshore zones were transferred to the new
sovereign state, Canada. It is indisputable, as the Supreme Court of
Canada similarly observed in the British Columbia Offshore
reference, that the limits of Newfoundland could have been
extended by the United Kingdom Parliament, but were not;
Newfoundland could have legislated ownership, in the common law
sense, over the offshore zones prior to Union, but it did not. Having
remained in the realm of international law and accruing to
international actors, sovereign states, rights in the offshore zones
adjacent to Newfoundland were transferred to Canada just as other
attributes of sovereignty were transferred to Canada at Union.
The conclusion is inescapable that Newfoundland, regardless of
whether or not it enjoyed rights at international law over its adjacent
offshore zones prior to Union, does not now have, nor has it since
Union, included within its limits the territorial sea and continental
shelf, nor rights recognized at international law in relation thereto.
Those rights are vested in Canada. One need only emphasize again
that in British Columbia Offshore, New South Wales and the
American "tidelands" decisions, property rights, as found to be
vested in the federal state, were not defined in terms of common law
ownership but as rights recognized at international law.
Finally, one commentator, writing in 1976, who concluded his
examination of these legal issues in favour of Newfoundland, noted
that:
2 43
242. J.L. Briefly, The Law of Nations (6th Ed.) (Oxford: Waldock, 1963), 162,
63; quoted in I.L. Head, "The Legal Clamour Over Canadian Off-Shore Minerals"
(1966-67), 5 Alta. L.R. 312, 315.
243. Swan, supra, note 217, 567.
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The forseeability prior to Newfoundland's entry into Confedera-
tion in 1949 of a 1979 offshore claim of Newfoundland was very
real, not only as to the territorial sea but even as to the continental
shelf.
If that view is correct, one may well wonder, hopefully without
impertinence, why the territorial description in Term 2 included no
reference to any offshore zones but rather delineated the territory of
Newfoundland in relation to surface land masses exclusively.
VI. The Maritime Provinces
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia entered the Canadian federation as
original provinces in 1867; Prince Edward Island joined subse-
quently in 1873. On the authority of R. v. Keyn, having been
decided in 1876, if accepted for the proposition that the territory of
the United Kingdom ended at low-water mark, there can be no
assertion of territorial sea ownership in these provinces; afortiori in
relation to claims to the continental shelf which was unknown as a
doctrine in 1867-73.
Accordingly, the territorial limits of the Maritime provinces
extend into the offshore zones only if so extended by their
respective constitutive instruments, or subsequent Imperial or
Canadian legislation of which there is none relevant. Colonial
legislation relating to customs and the fishery can be dismissed as
referrable to the legitimate exercise of specific legislative
jurisdiction per Croft v. Dunphy. 244
The Royal Commission issued in 1784 to Thomas Carleton, as
Governor, set forth the boundaries of the new province of New
Brunswick as follows:2 45
bounded on the westward by the mouth of the River Saint Croix,
by the said river to its source, and by a line drawn due north from
thence to the southern boundary of Our Province of Quebec, to
the northward by the said Bay and the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the
Bay call Bay Verte, to the south by a line in the centre of the Bay
of Fundy from the River Saint Croix, aforesaid, to the mouth of
the Musquat River, by the said river to its source and from thence
by a due east line across the isthmus into the Bay Verte to join the
eastern line above described, including all islands within six
leagues of the coast, with all the rights, members and
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging.
244. Supra, note 163.
245. Can. Sess. Papers 1883, no. 70, 47.
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The boundaries of Nova Scotia were described in the Royal
Commission issued in 1846 as follows:
246
bounded on the westward by a line drawn from Cape Sable across
the entrance to the centre of the Bay of Fundy; on the northward
by a line drawn along the centre of the said Bay to the mouth of
the Musquat River by the said river to its source, and from thence
by a due East line across the Isthmus into the Bay of Verte; on the
Eastward by the said Bay of Verte and the Gulf of St. Lawrence
to the Cape or Promontory called Cape Breton in the island of
that name, including the said Island, and also including all
Islands within six Leagues of the Coast, and on the Southward by
the Atlantic Ocean from the said Cape to Cape Sable aforesaid,
including the Island of that name, and all other Islands within
forty leagues of the Coast, with all the rights, members and
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging.
Prince Edward Island, the then Island of Saint John, was
described as "our island of Saint John, and Territories adjacent
thereto in America, and which now are or which heretofore have
been dependent thereupon. ..,,.47
Both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia having been described in
terms of definite land masses (except as to the Bay of Fundy which
was considered inland waters) with the addition of "all rights,
members and appurtenances" and Prince Edward Island having
been described in respect of the definite land mass of the Island
proper with the addition of "Territories adjacent thereto . . .", are
such as to include the territorial sea and continental shelf within the
limits of these provinces respectively? If one were to accept the
premise that the offshore zones are mere appurtenances of the
coastal state, 248 then there is scope for solid argument.
Alternatively, the territorial sea and continental shelf doctrines
being unknown concept in 1784, it is doubtful that a court would
willingly conclude that the residual reference to "appurtenances"
included such areas. This was, in essence, the holding of Jacobs, J.
in New South Wales. Referring to the boundary description of
Queensland, expressed in part "together with all and every the
adjacent islands, their members and appurtenances in the Pacific
Ocean", 2 49 Jacobs, J. stated:
246. LaForest, supra, note 228, 86.
247. Supra, note 245, 2; LaForest, supra, note 228, 87.
248. LaForest, supra, note 228, 101; E.C. Foley, Nova Scotia's Case for Coastal
and Offshore Resources (1981), 13 Ott. L.R. 281, 289.
249. Supra, note 143, 484.
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I do not think that the words "members and "appurtenances" are
apt to include the open sea surrounding the islands. Once it is
recognized that land between high and low-water mark is part of
an island it may be that the words add little but in any case there
does not appear any intention to do more than separate a part of
the territory of NewSouth Wales and so to erect a new colony.
250
A Canadian tribunal might well conclude similarly that such
descriptions relative to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and even
"Territories adjacent" relative to Prince Edward Island, were not
intended to convey or include within the limits of those provinces
either the territorial sea or the continental shelf. Consequently, the
rights to such zones are vested in Canada.
The legitimacy of federal claims to the offshore zones is
indisputable. These zones are rightly described as "Canada Lands"
in the Canada Oil and Gas Act 251 which inter alia defines that term
as:
lands that belong to Her Majesty in right of Canada, or in respect
of which Her Majesty in right of Canada has the right to dispose
of or exploit the natural resources, situated in. . .252
the northern territories or the offshore zones. It should be noted that
this definition distinguishes between the common law concept of
ownership and the rights of sovereign littoral states recognized by
the Geneva Conventions on the offshore zones.
Nova Scotia has also legislatively laid claim to the offshore zones
contiguous to the province by virtue of the Petroleum Resources
Act 2 53 which provides a definition of Nova Scotia lands, in which
all petroleum rights are deemed held in provincial ownership, as
including:
the land mass of Nova Scotia including Sable Island, and. . . the
seabed and subsoil off the shore of the land mass of Nova Scotia,
the seabed and subsoil of the Continental shelf and slope and the
seabed and subsoil seaward from the Continental shelf and slope
to the limit of exploitability.
254
Having accepted the legitimacy of federal offshore claims, this
legislation and all assertions of legal rights in the offshore must be
denied the five eastern provinces.
250. Id.
251. S.C. 1981, c. 81, s. 2.
252. Id.
253. S.N.S. 1980, c. 12.
254. Id., s. 7.
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VII. Equitable Claims
But what of equitable claims?
Adverting specifically to the equitable claims of the Atlantic
Provinces, one finds that they are legion. First, the Maritime
Provinces and Newfoundland geographically face the sea and
cultivate that resource intensely. Historically, the economic
development of the region has been closely tied to the offshore
zones. It, and not the continental land mass, has been the
cornerstone of existence and way of life in this region.
Second, specifically New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were
induced by the visions of a beneficial share in the great commercial
enterprise of the Confederation scheme, the development of the
resources of the "Great North West". This was the Confederation
raison d'etre as expounded to the Maritime people2 55 but in its
execution, the smaller Maritime Provinces were effectively
by-passed. The peoples of this region have not shared in the
economic development of the nation in a meaningful and beneficial
way.2 5
6
Third, onshore precedent exists favouring the five central
provinces in respect of their boundary limits which should be of
some equitable weight in considering offshore extension of the
coastal provinces, both Atlantic and Pacific. It was Canada the
nation, composed of its provincial integers, which purchased from
the Hudson's Bay Company the land territory out of which was
fashioned the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905257
and into which the provinces of Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba
255. e.g. Tupper, Debates, House of Assembly of Nova Scotia 1865, 211 "it is
quite impossible we can ever obtain that position that Nature intended we should
occupy, except through a Union of British North America, that will make Nova
Scotia the great highway between two continents... our harbours were intended
for the trade of a mighty nationality, of which Nova Scotia should be to a large
extent the entrepot".
256. Living Together: A Study of Regional Disparities (Ec. Council of Canada,
Ottawa: 1977) presents the economic realities or regional disparities in Canada and
includes data illustrating the regional effects of a variation in national
unemployment rates and fiscal policies and the inter-regional leakages of provincial
fiscal policies. In terms of unemployment, the report notes that a 2% increase in
national unemployment typically translates as an approximate increase of 3.7% in
the Atlantic region, 2.6% in Quebec, 1.9% in British Columbia, 1.7% in the
Prairies and 1.3% in Ontario. The economic structure of Ontario is such as to shield
its populace from the ravages of unemployment with the result that the effect is
roughly one-third that in the Atlantic region.
257. The Alberta Act, 1905, S.C. 1905, c. 3; The Saskatchewan Act, 1905, S.C.
1905, c. 42.
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were extended in 1912.258 Subsequently in 1930, the mineral rights
reserved to Canada in respect of the land territories of the Western
Provinces were transferred to those provinces. 259During the
currency of the latter two events, Maritime representatives in
Parliament pressed claims for compensation. For example, during
the session of 1907-08 when Sir Wilfred Laurier introduced a
resolution pertaining to the boundary extensions of the three central
provinces, a maritime Member of Parliament responded:
But I say to the government they are not acting justly to the
Maritime Provinces in not giving to them some compensation to
weigh against the large increase in material wealth which they are
adding to the three great provinces I have named.260
Such views were reasserted during debate on the mineral rights
transfer to the Western provinces in 1929.261
Fourth, the fact of offshore resources should not be treated
distinctly from onshore resources for constitutional or domestic
purposes. Provincial ownership of offshore resources finds
precedent in the ownership by Ontario of the lands covered by the
Great Lakes.
26 2
Fifth, these offshore zones have accrued to Canada because of
their contiguous relationship to the coastal provinces. The fact of
Canadian sovereignty as the international touchstone to the
recognition of these rights is solely due to the membership of the
coastal provinces in the Canadian federation.
The validity of these equitable claims may be denied by a
realization that most have already been asserted in respect of
demands for increased subsidies before various Commissions of
Inquiry. 263 However that may be true, the fact remains that the
inequities which existed then continue to exist without full redress.
258. The Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, S.C. 1912, c. 45; The Ontario
Boundaries Extension Act, S.C. 1912, c. 40; The Manitoba Boundaries Extension
Act, 1912, S.C. 1912, c. 32.
259. Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21 Geo. 5, s. 26 (U.K.).
260. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1907-08, vol. 7, 12819 (per G.W.
Fowler).
261. e.g. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1929, vol. 1, 190-211.
262. Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 68, s. 6; Territorial Division Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 497.
263. Report of the Royal Commission on Maritime Claims (Duncan Commission)
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1926); Report of the Royal Commission on Financial
Arrangements Between the Dominion and the Maritime Provinces (White
Commission) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1935); Report of the Royal Commission on
Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940).
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The increased levels of subsidies are not within the planning control
of the provincial governments and can be safely characterized as a
form of maintenance payments. By ceding to the coastal provinces
ownership of the offshore resources, Canada would open the full
range of provincial legislative jurisdiction such that the provinces
would be able to manage the resources to the most beneficial
advantage of their indigenous populations. Just as the Western
Provinces currently use such legislative and proprietary jurisdiction
to ensure the development of a sound industrial base, the Atlantic
provinces could ensure the local capturing of a greater measure of
the linkages flowing from offshore resource development.
Debate over the last decade concerning constitutional renewal has
produced divergent views on the offshore ownership issue. The
1972 Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada
resolved in favour of federal proprietary and legislative rights over
the offshore with federal-provincial revenue sharing. 264 The
Canadian Bar Association Committee, analogizing the offshore
with the pre-1930 mineral rights situation in the Western Provinces,
recommended provincial ownership and legislative jurisdiction with
federal objectives and obligations assured through "Parliament's
powers respecting defence, navigation, seacoast fisheries, customs
and other powers .. ., .65 The Ontario Select Committee on
Constitutional Reform similarly recommended provincial offshore
ownership and legislative jurisdiction "subject to federal
paramountcy in questions of environment, national defence and
international agreements. ' 266 Noting that it "will assist in
redressing economic imbalances within Confederation" ,267 the
Alberta government has also taken a stance favouring provincial
offshore ownership. Finally, an Opposition attempt to include in the
Constitution Act, 1982 a provision implementing provincial
offshore ownership was defeated by a 9-13 vote during the
deliberations of the Special Joint Committee in February, 1981.268
264. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on
the Constitution of Canada, Final Report (Ottawa: 1972), 66-67.
265. The Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Constitution, Towards a
New Canada (Montreal: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1978), 110.
266. Report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Reform (Toronto: Ontario
Queen's Printer, 1980), 21.
267. Harmony in Diversity: A New Federalism for Canada (Alberta Government
Position Paper, 1978), 7.
268. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, Issue 54, 80
(4 February, 198 1).
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All groups favouring provincial ownership did so in recognition of
the imbalances of economic Canada and the legitimacy of the
equitable claims of the coastal provinces.
The federal government has consistently taken the position that
the "offshore belongs to all Canadians. ' 269 It has, however,
offered to coastal provinces generous shares of offshore revenues.
On 1 February 1977 the federal and Maritime governments signed a
memorandum of understanding pertaining to offshore development
and revenue sharing. The memorandum provided for the creation of
Mineral Resources Administration lines at least five kilometres
from low water mark - revenues yielded from the landward side of
these lines would have accrued 100% to the adjacent province while
revenues yielded from the seaward side of the line would have been
shared on a 25:75 federal-adjacent provincial split with the
provincial share subject to a nondefined regional revenue sharing
pool.2 70 Administration and management of offshore resources was
to have been through the mechanism of a joint Maritime Offshore
Resources Board.2
71
This memorandum, never agreed to by Newfoundland and
subsequently repudiated by Nova Scotia, has recently been
supplanted by a comprehensive Canada - Nova Scotia Agreement
on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management and Revenue
Sharing.2 72 The Agreement, though expressed to be "without
prejudice to and notwithstanding [the] respective legal
positions ' 2 73 of the parties, is, for all practical purposes, an
abandonment by Nova Scotia of legal pretensions to the offshore
zones. It follows the pattern of the earlier memorandum in
employing a joint Canada - Nova Scotia Offshore Oil and Gas
Board in the administration and management of the resources
offshore of that province, though the Canada Oil and Gas Lands
Administration (COGLA) is the designated primary overseer of oil
269. The National Energy Program (Ottawa: Energy, Mines & Resources 1980),
42.
270. Federal-Provincial Memorandum of Understanding in Respect of the
Administration and Management of Mineral Resources Offshore of the Maritime
Provinces, 1 February, 1977, para. 10.
271. See, R.J. Harrison, The Offshore Mineral Resources Agreement in the
Maritime Provinces (1978), 4 Dal. L.J. 245.
272. Canada - Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource
Management and Revenue Sharing, 2 March 1982, para. 3(b).
273. Id., para. 1.
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and gas resource activities.2 74 It is not the Board, composed of a 3-2
federal-provincial membership split, however, which has final
effective say in administering or managing the offshore but rather
the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources to whom the
Board is responsible 275 and in whom rests the power to substitute
his own decision for that of the Board or in the absence of a decision
by the Board. 276 In dissent, the management control enjoyed by
Nova Scotia consists in a varying suspension power in respect of
such matters as an exploration agreement, Canada benefits plan or
provincial lease.2 77 The period of suspension is expressly limited to
a total of 18 months. 278 This limited provincial administrative
authority cannot be characterized as entirely consistent with Nova
Scotia legal offshore rights. It is to be further noted that the
regulatory legislation referred to in the Agreement - the Canada
Oil and Gas Act specifically defines the offshore zones as "Canada
lands" .279
On the revenue side, Nova Scotia is to receive 100% of defined
"offshore revenues" during each year that:
the Nova Scotia government's per capita fiscal capacity including
its share of offshore revenues, does not exceed 100% of the
national average per capita fiscal capacity plus 2 percentage
points for every percentage point by which Nova Scotia's average
annual employment rate exceeds the national average annual
unemployment rate. 280
In the eventuality that the provincial per capita fiscal capacity
exceeds the level of 110% of the national, there is a varying
schedule of revenue sharing subject to the ceiling that the provincial
274. Id., para 4; see, Canada Oil and Gas Act, supra, note 231: Oil and Gas
Production and Conservation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-4 (as amended).
275. Supra, note 272, para. 3(b).
276. Id., para. 3(f) (subject to stipulated time and notice provisions).
277. Id., para. 3(d).
278. Id., para. 3(d) (v).
279. Supra, note 251.
280. Supra., note 272, para. 15(d). "Offshore revenues" are defined as (i) the
10% basic royalty enacted by virtue of Canada Oil and Gas Act, supra, note 251,
s. 40, (ii) the 40% net profit progressive incremental royalty specified in the same
Act, (iii) revenues generated in the offshore zone by application of the provincial
corporate tax, (iv) and retail sales tax, (v) and bonus payments, (vi) net rental and
licence fees.
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per capita fiscal capacity shall not exceed 140% of the national
average.
281
The quintessential paragraph illustrating the absence of provincial
offshore legal pretensions provides for provincial participation in
the federal crown share in offshore interest reserved by the Canada
Oil and Gas Act. 289 The agreement allows Nova Scotia to purchase,
with future production revenues and at an agreed formula, up to a
50% portion of the federal crown share in a natural gas field and up
to 25% in an oil field. 283 One does not normally purchase or acquire
an interest in respect of something one claims or asserts legal rights
of ownership.
Leaving to others the assessment of the economic terms of the
Agreement, it cannot be denied that this acknowledged "political
settlement", from the perspective of purely legal positions, is a
satisfactory achievement for Nova Scotia especially with respect to
the recognition (de facto) of provincial ownership and control of
Sable Island resources. 284 However, from the perspective of
neighbouring provinces, it provides a somewhat less than stirring
precedent. The silence of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island
at the announcement of the Agreement has surely been detrimental
to their better interests since those provinces have lost any share in
Nova Scotia offshore revenues due to the elimination of the regional
revenue sharing pool contained in the former memorandum. For
those provinces and Newfoundland, the Agreement is defective in
leaving to Canada, not Nova Scotia, effective control of the
development and management of offshore resources.
It is ownership alone which will guarantee to the coastal
provinces the measure of constitutional jurisdiction necessary to
ensure maximization of the benefits of offshore development to the
local economy and populations. Whether this will evolve is
unknown, but what is known is that the equities favour it.
With the question of the Newfoundland offshore currently before
the Courts, perhaps a fitting conclusion to this constitutional
discussion would be to note without further comment the irony of
the following resolution adopted at the Quebec Conference of 1864:
281. Id., para. 15(i).
282. Supra, note 251, s. 27.
283. Supra, note 272, para. 13.
284. Id., para. 24.
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In consideration of the surrender to the General Government by
Newfoundland of all its Mines and Minerals and of all the
ungranted and unoccupied Lands of the Crown, it is agreed that
the sum of $150,000 shall each year be paid to that Province by
semiannual payments. . . .285
285. G.P. Browne, Documents on the Confederation of British North America
(Toronto: McCIelland & Stewart Ltd., 1969), 164.
